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Max Huffman*
INTRODUCTION 
The attractions of the U.S. forum for foreign plaintiffs;1 the 
sophistication of the U.S. class-action bar;2 steadily and rapidly 
increasing global economic interdependence; and instant around-the-
world communication3 have combined to bring foreign plaintiffs in 
ever-increasing numbers into U.S. courts.    Nowhere is this reality 
more apparent than in the antitrust arena.  The U.S. system promises 
“jury trials, wide-ranging pretrial discovery without judicial 
supervision * * *, extraterritorial discovery, treble damages,”—a 
 
* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law (2005-2007).  J.D., 
University of Cincinnati College of Law (1998); B.A., Cornell University (1995).  Thanks 
to Richard R. Huffman, for his lifelong mentorship; to Roy T. Englert, Jr., and Donald J. 
Russell for early guidance and inspiration on this topic; and to Darren Bush, my wife 
Patricia V. Galvan, Donna Nagy, and Michael Van Alstine for invaluable comments on 
drafts of this article.  Opinions and errors are my responsibility.  
1 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (forum non conveniens 
decision rejecting effort to sue in U.S. court under U.S. tort laws over an airplane crash that 
occurred in Scotland). See also Smith Kline & French Labs Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 
730 (C.A. 1982) (Lord Denning) (“As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to 
the United States.  If he can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune.”). 
2 See Lily Henning, Antitrust Goes Global: D.C. Circuit Opens the Door to Foreign 
Victims of Vitamin Price Fixing, Legal Times, Oct. 13, 2003 (“Already some lawyers have 
begun to cast their nets for client, hopping planes to places as far afield as the Czech 
Republic to look for purchasers who bought vitamins from cartel members.”). 
3 See ibid. (noting that foreign plaintiffs are contacting plaintiffs’ counsel). 
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remedy scheme available only under U.S. law—“class actions, [and] 
contingent fees.”4 These features combine to create “a multi-color 
brochure for international antitrust tourism.”5
Efforts by private plaintiffs to enforce the U.S. antitrust laws 
extraterritorially have become an enormous industry.6 The effects of 
those efforts may be positive for those private plaintiffs  who are 
successful, but they threaten significant consequences for defendants 
and federal courts now faced with worldwide class actions and the 
attendant procedural difficulties.  Defendants’ calculus of litigation 
risk must undergo wholesale revision.  And extraterritorial 
enforcement efforts threaten consequences for public enforcement 
and for international relations that are only beginning to be 
understood.7
A recent reflection of the challenges facing federal courts in this 
global age, F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (Empagran)8
is the most recent in a long line of decisions testing the 
extraterritorial reach of the U.S. antitrust laws—a line extending 
nearly a century back to Justice Holmes’s 1909 opinion in American 
Banana.9 The Empagran Court held the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA)10 precluded the assertion by 
U.S. courts of jurisdiction over claims by foreign plaintiffs alleging 
harm felt in wholly foreign commerce.11 The holding applied to 
 
4 Joseph P. Griffin, Foreign Governmental Reactions to U.S. Assertions of Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction, 6 Geo Mason L. Rev. 505, 516 (1998).  
5 Deputy Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim, Remarks: Department of Justice 
Perspectives on International Antitrust Enforcement: Recent Legal Developments and 
Policy Implications 17 (Nov. 18, 2003) (Remarks), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/201509.pdf . 
6 See Delrahim, Remarks, supra, at 3 (referring to a “new breed of plaintiffs”). 
7 The attention to the issues has not been confined to the courthouse.  One Department of 
Justice official, addressing “U.S. ‘judicial imperialism’ in private antitrust damages 
actions,” noted the “level of attention and concern the [extraterritoriality] cases have 
attracted in the international community.”  Deputy Assistant Attorney General Makan 
Delrahim, Department of Justice Perspectives on International Antitrust Enforcement: 
Recent Legal Developments and Policy Implications 9-10 (Nov. 18, 2003), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/201509.pdf. 
8 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
9 203 U.S. 347 (1909) (Holmes, J.). 
10 15 U.S.C. § 6a. 
11 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 159. 
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claims of foreign harm lacking any nexus to an effect in domestic 
U.S. commerce.12 
The Empagran Court included in its opinion an exception that 
may well swallow its general rule.  While plaintiffs not alleging a 
sufficient nexus between an effect in domestic commerce and their 
own wholly foreign harm are precluded from suit in federal court, 
plaintiffs able sufficiently to show “the anticompetitive conduct’s 
domestic effects were linked to their foreign harm” are excepted 
from the limitation.13 This important exception is the “Empagran 
exception.” 
 Ongoing litigation in lower courts shows the Empagran exception 
has the effect of encouraging artful pleading of nexuses between 
domestic effects and foreign harm, injecting as much uncertainty into 
the extraterritoriality analysis under the FTAIA as existed before 
 
Beyond merely posing difficult substantive issues, the Empagran litigation raised a 
hubbub of tremendous proportions in the international commercial and regulatory 
communities.  See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, National Courts, Global Cartels: F. 
Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (U.S. Supreme Court 2004), 5 German L. Rev. 
1095 (2004) (“foreign receptivity to U.S. enforcement efforts came to an end” as a result of 
the lower court’s opinion in Empagran).  The line-up of amici curiae in the Supreme Court 
included, on the petitioner’s side, several national governments and business organizations.  
See the Supreme Court online docket for 03-724, available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/ 03-724.htm (visited February 7, 2006).  
Amici included the governments of the United States, Canada, Germany, Belgium, the 
United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, the Netherlands and Japan, and business organizations 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Organization for International Investment, the 
International Chamber of Commerce, and an association of European banks.  On the 
respondent’s side, a public-interest firm and myriad economics and law professors filed 
papers as amici. See ibid. Amici for respondent included the public interest firm Public 
Citizen, a so-called Committee to Support the Antitrust Laws, and several notable 
economists and economics professors and law professors. 
 None of this excitement should be a surprise when one considers the size of the potential 
damages awards at issue in litigation that, like Empagran, raises the possibility of applying 
to claims by world-wide plaintiff classes the U.S. approach of trebling damages awards in 
antitrust litigation.  See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15.  Treble damage awards are by no 
means a universally, or even commonly, accepted remedy.  See Griffin, 6 GEO. MASON L. 
REV., supra, at 516.  So too with procedural aspects of antitrust litigation in the United 
States, perhaps most notably the class action device.  See ibid.; supra n. 6 & accompanying 
text. 
12 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 159. 
13 Id. at 175. 
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Empagran.14 On remand (Empagran II), the D.C. Circuit held that 
plaintiffs’ allegations—that fixed prices in domestic U.S. commerce 
were the but-for cause of their harm as purchasers in wholly foreign 
commerce—fell short of establishing the nexus requirement.15 Some 
courts have followed suit, and some have diverged.  As these 
inconsistent decisions show, the battle over extraterritoriality now 
has shifted to how to define the degree of nexus required under the 
Empagran exception.16 This issue will not resolve itself neatly.  
With the steadily increasing interdependence of the world 
economy,17 private efforts to apply U.S. laws extraterritorially  will 
continue to be a hotbed of litigation activity.18 
14 See supra nn. 194-219 and accompanying text (describing cases). 
15 Empagran, S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-Laroche Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(Empagran II), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1043 (2006). 
16 See, e.g., Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, __ (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (holding that the Empagran exception requires allegations that harm suffered in 
foreign commerce was proximately caused by an effect felt in domestic U.S. commerce). 
17 See, e.g., John M. Connor, Extraterritoriality of the Sherman Act and Deterrence of 
Private International Cartels, Purdue Univ. Dep’t of Agricultural Econ. Staff Paper 04-08, 
at 1 (2004) (“Today, many industries are led by a few multinational companies with sales 
spread across the Northern Hemisphere * * *.”); Goeffrey Hazard, From Whom No Secrets 
Are Hid, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1665, 1666 (1998) (noting steadily increasing international 
issues). 
 On the question of litigation activity going forward, see 2 Spencer W. Waller, ANTITRUST 
AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ABROAD § 13:23 (3d ed., Supp. 2005) (“This issue is being 
tested in the current wave of cases testing whether foreign purchasers injured abroad may 
sue in the United States when there is a substantial domestic impact, but where the 
plaintiff’s injury is felt solely outside the United States * * *.  Despite the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Empagran, important questions remain as what circumstances, if any, foreign 
antitrust plaintiffs suffering injury abroad can bring their claims to U.S. courts.  Years of 
additional litigation or statutory change will be necessary to definitively resolve this critical 
question.”) (footnotes omitted).  See also 1 id. § 9.7 (“The FTAIA is an immensely 
important statute.”). 
 Private plaintiff efforts to bring matters before U.S. courts and take advantage of U.S. 
litigation procedure and substantive rules of law are not limited to the antitrust context.  
Famous examples of forum shopping exist.  See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Reyno, 454 
U.S. 235 (1981) (forum non conveniens decision rejecting effort to sue in U.S. court under 
U.S. tort laws over an airplane crash that occurred in Scotland).  Other significant 
substantive legal schemes that raise the extraterritoriality issues discussed in this article 
include the federal securities laws and RICO.  Analysis of the application of these 
arguments to those, and possibly other, schemes would be valuable. 
18 See Delrahim, Remarks, supra, at 17. 
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The article explores the Empagran exception and is the first to 
propose a workable and consistent approach for its application.  The 
article proceeds in three parts.  In Part I it gives some background of 
the statutory scheme and the prudential antitrust standing doctrine.  
In Part II it considers Empagran in more depth and argues the 
Court’s holding is best understood by reference to principles of 
antitrust standing.  In Part III the article examines courts’ recent 
efforts to apply the Empagran exception and shows how standing 
doctrine could be applied to improve on those efforts. 
 The article concludes courts’ treatment of the Empagran 
exception reflect a lack of understanding of the essential legal 
scheme.  Well-understood principles of antitrust standing, a 
prudential doctrine that permits courts to deny plaintiffs the right to 
sue if they are not appropriately efficient vindicators of the policies 
underlying the U.S. antitrust laws, will provide better means of 
dealing with issues of extraterritorial application going forward. 
 
I. BACKGROUND OF ANTITRUST STANDING AND THE CONTROVERSY 
OVER EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
A.  Understanding Antitrust Standing 
 
Standing is a threshold inquiry that a court will address before 
turning to the merits of a plaintiff’s claim.19 Standing doctrine exists 
to ensure the plaintiff suing is appropriately situated to vindicate the 
purposes of the antitrust laws.  The purpose of the private action, in 
turn, is twofold: (1) deterring conduct Congress has determined to be 
 
19 See 1 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Fundamentals of Antitrust Law, § 3.03d, 
at 97 (2003) (noting that “the antitrust injury doctrine depends less on the plaintiff’s proof 
than on its theory of injury, and theories that do not depend on proof are well suited to pre-
discovery disposition”); id. § 3.03a, at 91 (antitrust injury doctrine “enables antitrust courts 
to dispose of more claims at an early stage of litigation by simply examining the logic of the 
plaintiff’s theory of injury”) (citing Juster Assocs. v. City of Rutland, 901 F.2d 266, 270 (2d 
Cir. 1990)). 
 Antitrust standing is distinct from the Article III standig analysis, which inquires whether 
there is a case or controversy providing a court constitutional authority to hear an issue. 
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inimical to U.S. economic interests, and (2) compensating plaintiffs 
for harm suffered by an antitrust violation.20 
Antitrust standing doctrine enjoys a long pedigree.  The common-
law background to Clayton Act Section 4 (Section 4),21 the private 
right of action provision of the antitrust scheme, was rife with extra-
statutory limitations on recovery.22 Primary limitations included 
such well-known concepts as proximate cause and certainty of 
damages.23 Early judicial glosses on Sherman Act Section 7, the 
precursor to Section 4, imposed these common law limitations to 
suits by antitrust plaintiffs.24 Reliance on common law principles 
was carried forward with the enactment of Section 4, and remains the 
norm today.25 
20 See William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 
1445, 1450 (1985) (citing Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust 
Standing, 86 Yale L.J. 809 (1977)); Phillip E. Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage 
Recoveries, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1127, 1127 (1976). 
21 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).  The section reads in pertinent part: 
(a) Amount of recovery; prejudgment interest 
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason 
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any 
district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant 
resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in 
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, 
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. 
22 See Associated General Contractors of California v. California State Council of 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 532-533 (1983). 
23 See id. at 532 (citing F. Bohlen, Cases on the Law of Torts 292-312 (2d ed. 1925), and 3 
J. Lawson, Rights, Remedies, and Practice 1740 (1890)). 
 As Judge Posner colorfully has noted, these limitations include: 
venerable principles of tort causation illustrated by Gorris v. Scott, 9
L.R. Ex.-125 (1874).  The plaintiff’s animals, which were being 
transported on the deck of the defendant’s ship, were washed overboard 
in a storm.  They would have been saved if the deck had been penned, 
as was required by statute.  But since the purpose of the statute was to 
prevent contagion, not drowning, the defendant was not liable. 
Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Building, Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 708-709 (7th Cir. 
1984). 
24 See, e.g., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910) (no standing for 
shareholder of victim company because the injury was “indirect, remote and 
consequential”).  
25 See Associated General Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 531 (1983) (“Congress intended the [Sherman] Act to be construed in light of 
its common law background.”).  Cf. American Soc. of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel 
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Three doctrines comprise the modern antitrust standing analysis.26 
The first is antitrust injury, most prominently attributed to Brunswick 
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,27 which requires that the injury for 
which a plaintiff seeks recompense be an injury of the sort the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent.28 The second is the “indirect 
purchaser” analysis from Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.29 Since 
Illinois Brick, it generally has been the rule that, as among plaintiffs 
who seek standing as customers, only those plaintiffs that purchased 
directly from the defendant had standing to sue for antitrust injury.  
The third aspect of the standing inquiry is a vaguely defined 
 
Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 568 n.6 (1982) (“imposing liability * * * in accord with those common 
law [agency] principles honors the congressional intent behind the antitrust statutes”). 
26 “Antitrust standing” exists only if, at a minimum, the harm suffered is of a sort against 
which the antitrust laws were meant to protect.  More is required.  See William H. Page, 
Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 467, 497 (1980) (“Antitrust injury is a rule of standing in the broad sense insofar as 
it defines the type of harm that is compensable * * *.  The antitrust standing doctrine, 
however, narrows the class of those who may recover for antitrust injury.”).  The plaintiff 
must be an appropriately efficient plaintiff to vindicate the purposes of the antitrust laws.  In 
addition to antitrust injury, to have antitrust standing the plaintiff must convince the court 
that factors such as the directness of the injury, the existence of other plaintiffs, concerns for 
manageability of the litigation, and the danger of complex damages apportionment weigh in 
favor of the plaintiff’s suit proceeding.  See Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 
540-544. 
27 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
28 Harm is a requirement of the prudential antitrust standing doctrine, which turns in part on 
whether a plaintiff’s “harm” can be termed “antitrust injury.”  See Associated General 
Contractors, 459 U.S. 519, 535 (1983); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 
477, 489 (1977).  See also John E. Lopatka & William F. Page, Brunswick at 25: Antitrust 
Injury and the Evolution of Antitrust Law, 17 Antitrust 20, 20-21 (2002); Philip E. Areeda, 
Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1127, 1130-1136 
(1976).  Harm is also a requirement of Article III standing.  As a constitutional matter, 
federal courts only have power to hear a case if there is “injury in fact.”  See Associated 
General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 535 n.31 (differentiating between Article III standing and 
antitrust standing).  “Antitrust injury” is injury that flows from a violation of the antitrust 
laws, and not just from a violation, but from that which made the conduct illegal.  See 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1977) (rejecting argument 
that plaintiffs need only prove “they are in a worse position than they would have been had 
the petitioner not committed those acts,” and requiring proof of “antitrust injury, which is to 
say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that 
which makes defendants’ acts unlawful”). 
29 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
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amalgam of other considerations contributing to the prudential 
question whether a court should entertain a private antitrust action. 
 
1.  The Classical Standing Framework 
 
The Supreme Court’s most complete and coherent statement of 
the antitrust standing doctrine came in Associated General 
Contractors of California v. California State Council of 
Carpenters.30 The Court announced an inquiry involving five 
considerations courts should balance to determine whether the 
plaintiff is the appropriate one to vindicate the policies of the 
antitrust laws: (1) the question of antitrust injury; (2) whether the 
plaintiff is a direct purchaser; (3) whether other plaintiffs are 
available to sue if standing is denied to this plaintiff; (4) concerns for 
“judicial manageability”; and (5) concerns for “either the risk of 
duplicate recoveries * * * or the danger of complex apportionment of 
damages.”31 
Antitrust injury holds that the plaintiff “must prove * * * injury of 
the type the antitrust laws were meant to prevent and that flows from 
that which makes the defendants’ acts unlawful.”32 Brunswick Corp. 
held a plaintiff could not sue for injury caused by an increase in 
competition from the defendant’s acquisition of the plaintiff’s 
 
30 Associated General Contractors of California v. California State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 437 (1983).  See generally deAtucha v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 
510, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that “analysis of standing under [Clayton Act] § 4" 
should start “with the Supreme Court opinions in Associated General Contractors * * * and 
Blue Shield of Virginia v. McReady, 457 U.S. 519 (1982)). 
31 Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 540-544. 
 One commentator quite reasonably, but incorrectly, reads into Associated General 
Contractors a sixth element in the standing analysis, that of the defendant’s intent toward 
the particular plaintiff.   See C. Douglas Floyd, Antitrust Violations Without Antitrust 
Remedies: The Narrowing of Standing in Private Antitrust Actions, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 8 
(1997) (citing Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 537).  See also Associated 
General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 537 n.35 (“specific intent of defendant to cause injury to a 
particular class of persons should ‘ordinarily be dispositive’ in creating standing to sue”) 
(citation omitted).  The opaque discussion in Associated General Contractors of this 
element concludes that “improper motive * * * is not a panacea that will enable any 
complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss.”  Id. at 437. “[T]he motive allegation [is not] of 
controlling importance.”  Id. at 437 n.37. 
32 Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489. 
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competitor.33 Other contexts of the application of the injury doctrine 
include preventing claims by employees alleging harm from conduct 
that harms their employers and claims by plaintiffs with business 
relationship with the victim of an antitrust violation.34 Those types 
of cases have in common the fact that the plaintiff’s harm is 
derivative. 
 Illinois Brick precludes plaintiffs from suing as purchasers 
alleging harm on a pass-through theory, whereby their harm in 
paying inflated prices to a middleman is derivative of the 
middleman’s own harm.35 The primary concern underlying the 
Illinois Brick holding is that of duplicate recovery if both direct and 
indirect plaintiffs are able to sue.36 This element serves the essential 
function of the injury element in the case of plaintiffs who are 
purchasers.37 
33 Brunswick, 429 U.S. at ___.  The plaintiff alleged the competitor otherwise would have 
gone out of business, giving plaintiff a monopoly.  Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488; Roger D. 
Blair & William H. Page, The Role of Economics in Defining Antitrust Injury and Standing,
in ___,at 70.  The Court noted that “if respondents were injured * * *, while respondents’ 
loss occurred ‘by reason of’ the unlawful acquisitions, it did not occur ‘by reason of’ that 
which made the acquisitions unlawful.”  Ibid. “What made the merger unlawful, however, 
was the potential for predatory behavior on Brunswick’s part.  But this had nothing to do 
with Pueblo’s reduced profits.  Page & Blair, ___, supra, at 70. 
34 Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 740 F.2d 739, 751 (9th Cir. 1984) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(dissenting from a finding of employee standing); Hairston v. Pac-10 Conference, 101 F.3d 
1315, 1320-1321 (9th Cir. 1996) (Trott, J., concurring) (no antitrust standing for business 
associates of victim of an antitrust violation). 
 And while the current statement of the antitrust injury rationale is less than 30 years old, 
the doctrine has a long pedigree.  As early as 1910, the Third Circuit held that “neither a 
creditor nor a stockholder that was injured by a violation of the antitrust laws could recover 
treble damages.”  Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 533 (citing Loeb v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 183 Fed. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910)). 
35 In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), the plaintiffs alleged harm from a 
price-fixing conspiracy.  Id. at 726-727.  The plaintiffs did not purchase directly from the 
defendants, but were end users of the products.  They alleged harm on a “pass-through” 
theory.  Id. at 727.    The direct purchasers were distributors, who sold to contractors, who 
in turn sold to plaintiffs.  Ibid. They claimed to pay higher prices for the products because 
the direct purchasers’ prices were passed to their customers, who in turn passed them on to 
the plaintiffs.  Ibid.
36 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 730-731 (citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 
251 (1972)). 
37 But cf. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., ___ (holding a state does not have standing to 
sue in parens patriae status for harm to its general economy based partly on a concern for 
duplicate recovery). 
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The other three elements of the Associated General Contractors 
standing inquiry generally inform the question whether the plaintiff is 
an efficient vindicator of the purposes of the antitrust laws.  A failure 
to establish one or all of the remaining elements should not destroy 
standing for a plaintiff that can establish antitrust injury or, if 
relevant, direct purchase.  But meeting the latter three elements might 
perhaps create standing where the first two elements are not met.38 
Standing more likely will be found for the particular plaintiff before 
the court if no other private persons would make appropriate 
plaintiffs.39 The “other plaintiff” element is explained by the perhaps 
self-evident proposition that for the deterrent function of the private 
remedy to be fulfilled, some private plaintiff should be able to sue to 
vindicate harm caused by an antitrust violation.40 If no other private 
plaintiff exists, and the other elements of the Associated General 
Contractors analysis are satisfied, it would frustrate the purposes of 
the private remedy to deny standing to this plaintiff.41 
The “other plaintiff” element is harder to justify under the 
compensation rationale.  If a plaintiff has suffered antitrust injury, it 
should be entitled to an opportunity to prove its right to 
 
Arguably, the “business associate” form of derivative harm (see Hairson v. Pac-10 
Conference, 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996)) is more closely analogous to the Illinois Brick 
rule than it is to the Brunswick rule. 
38 See, e.g., Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982) (finding standing in a 
situation in which commentators agree antitrust injury was not satisfied). 
39 Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 542. 
40 This explanation supports the view expressed by some scholars that the deterrence 
function of private antitrust enforcement predominates over the compensation function.  See 
infra n. 53. 
41 Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp noted, “[o]f course, the remote plaintiff may become 
the only one when the immediate victim has some reason to avoid suing or is itself deficient 
in standing, antitrust injury, or ability to prove damages.”  1 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Fundamentals of Antitrust Law § 3.05e, at 112-113 (2003). 
 This element best justifies the much-criticized holding in Blue Shield of Virginia v. 
McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982).  For criticism, see, e.g., id. at 485 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); Page, 37 Stan. L. Rev., supra, at 1449 (“The Court’s attempt to fit the various 
doctrines into a coherent pattern, however, was notably unsuccessful. McCready is 
particularly unfortunate because it seriously undermines the concept of antitrust injury.”). in 
which a patient was held to have standing to sue her health insurance provider alleging a 
conspiracy to exclude psychologists from Blue Shield’s health plans. See 457 U.S. at 484-
485 (Clayton Act section 4 applies to “any person” injured “by reason of’ an antitrust 
violation). 
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compensation, whether or not other plaintiffs also enjoy a right to 
seek compensation.  For this reason, this element can be thought to 
create standing if it does not otherwise exist.  But the “other 
plaintiff” element should not be permitted to destroy standing.  The 
compensation function will be served only if the particular plaintiff 
suffering antitrust injury has a right to sue.42 
Standing is less likely to be found if a suit by that plaintiff would 
be unmanageable for the court system.43 The Court in Associated 
General Contractors gave scant indication how to understand this 
element of the analysis.44 The first two elements might be specific 
instances of the application of this element.  The more direct 
plaintiff’s injury, the less danger of “‘long and complicated 
proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated 
theories.’”45 If plaintiff’s harm is a sort meant to be protected against, 
 
42 See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 1991, 2003 (2006) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“If multiple plaintiffs are direct victims of a tort, it would be unjust 
to declare some of their lawsuits unnecessary for deterrence absent any basis for doing so in 
the relevant statute.”).  But see Page, 37 Stan. L. Rev., supra, at 1452 (“If compensation 
were taken as a standard, then all causally related harms would be compensable, and the 
resulting deterrent effects would be unpredictable from an economic point of view.”).  
Professor Page’s argument assumes the compensation function is permitted to override the 
antitrust injury requirement.  This article treats the injury element as an essential 
prerequisite to achieving the appropriate level of compensation. 
43 Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 543 & n.50 (noting that a concern for 
judicial manageability was discussed in the legislative history of the Sherman Act).    
Statements by Senator Edmunds contained in the legislative history of the Sherman Act 
noted concerns that “‘everybody might sue everybody else in one common suit and have a 
regular pot-pourri of the affair * * * and take twenty years in order to get a result as to a 
single one of them.’”  Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 543 n.50 (quoting 21 
Cong. Rec. 3148 (1890)). 
44 An analogy might be made to the context of class action certification.  One requirement 
for certification of a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) is that the class be 
manageable.  “Manageable,” in the context of Rule 23, requires a court to balance the 
benefits to be gained from certification against the administrative and ministerial challenges 
inherent in entertaining the action as a class action.  7A Wright et al., Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 1780, at 189-190.  Certification should not be granted if the challenges are not 
overborne by corresponding efficiency benefits.  Ibid. Analogous to Senator Edmunds’ 
concerns in 1890, the manageability criterion aims to streamline the “interminable 
litigation” that might occur when large numbers, all claiming an interest in the subject 
matter of a suit, are permitted to sue. 
45 Associated GeneralContractors, 459 U.S. at 543 (quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United 
Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493 (1968)). 
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the unmanageability threshold that the system should be willing to 
endure to provide that plaintiff a remedy is much higher. 
 Again, for the deterrence and compensation functions of the 
private remedy to be served, the manageability element cannot 
destroy standing that exists under the first two elements.  The 
marginal cost to the system of each additional plaintiff, especially in 
the context of class action litigation, is small and decreasing.  And 
the difference between marginal benefit to the plaintiff and the 
marginal cost to the defendant from permitting each individual 
plaintiff to sue remains constant as the number of plaintiffs increases.  
Thus, the same arguments for permitting one plaintiff to sue support 
permitting another.  The result is that if a plaintiff can demonstrate 
antitrust injury and direct purchase, no matter how unwieldy the 
litigation, that plaintiff should be permitted to sue.46 
Courts also should consider whether permitting the plaintiff’s suit 
would create the risk of complex apportionment of damages.47 The 
archetypal example of denying standing for concerns of complexity is 
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.48 In that case, the Court denied standing 
to sue in parens patriae status to a state government seeking to 
collect for harm suffered generally in the state economy.49 An 
important underpinning of that holding was the impossibility of 
proving the amount of relief to be awarded.50 
 
46 If the fact of unmanageability of the litigation can undo standing for private plaintiffs, an 
antitrust violator would be well-served to harm as many plaintiffs as possible—the opposite 
of the deterrence goal of the private remedy.  Cf. 7AA Charles A. Wright et al., Federal 
Practice & Procedure § 1780, at 196 (noting concerns for giving defendants incentives to 
harm as many plaintiffs as possible, thereby undermining manageability). 
47 Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 545. 
48 405 U.S. 251 (1972). 
49 See id. at 262-266. 
50 Id. at 262 n.14 (“Measurement of an injury to the general economy, on the other hand, 
necessarily involves an examination of the impact of a restraint of trade upon every variable 
that affects the State's economic health—a task extremely difficult, ‘in the real economic 
world rather than an economist's hypothetical model.’”) (quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. 
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 489 (1968)).  Hawaii also relied on the danger of 
duplicate recovery, the rationale underlying Illinois Brick.
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2.  Protecting the Purposes of Private Enforcement 
 
Scholarship supports the proposition that the ideal private remedy 
is one that serves perfectly the deterrent function.51 But in turn, the 
ideal deterrence is one that perfectly compensates the plaintiff for the 
harm it has suffered.52 The challenge facing courts is to fashion 
remedies that both deter and compensate appropriately—a process to 
which scholars have referred as “optimizing” remedies.53 Four 
interrelated bodies of doctrine—substantive standards for antitrust 
 
51 Page, supra, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 1450-1452.  Professor Page has argued that of the dual 
purposes of private antitrust enforcement, “the deterrence function must predominate” in 
determining the appropriate private remedy.  See Page, supra, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 1451.  
Professor Page argues that deterrence makes compensation to private plaintiffs unnecessary 
(id. at 1452).  That argument ignores the necessity for incentives for private plaintiffs to 
bring suit to deter violations.  He further argues that “only deterrence provides a coherent 
standard for imposition of an efficient penalty.”  Ibid. That is an appropriate analysis in the 
context of public enforcement, but has no application in the context of private enforcement.  
It also ignores the clear mandate of Congress in Clayton Act section 4 to provide treble 
damages compensation.  Professor Page’s discussion of why compensation to plaintiffs 
cannot be the sole governing standard for determining an antitrust remedy—“all causally 
related harms would be compensable, and the resulting deterrent effects would be 
unpredictable from an economic point of view”—is strong.  The solution is to strike an 
acceptable balance between the deterrence and compensation rationales, as the Supreme 
Court did in Associated General Contractors, and not to write compensation out of the 
analysis.  Professor Page implicitly recognizes this role of compensation in evaluating the 
perfect antitrust remedy: “Any system of deterrence must define the size of the deterrent 
penalty and identify the person who will bring suit.”  Page, supra, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 1452 
(emphasis added).  Identifying the correct plaintiff has nothing to do with deterrence.  It is 
purely a function of compensating the correct party, or parties, for the injury suffered.  That 
argument ignores the primacy of the antitrust injury element.  If deterrence were the only, or 
primary, goal, the result would be accomplished as efficiently by granting the enforcement 
agencies more significant civil enforcement powers.  This is especially so in light of the 
inverse-deterrence concerns highlighted in Empagran. See infra nn. 68-71and 
accompanying text.  Unlike the public enforcement regime, private enforcement does not 
entail any purely deterrent or punitive aspects.  To the extent a private remedy is deterrent, 
that is derivative of the compensation to private plaintiffs.  Any punitive aspect of the 
private remedy is the result of overcompensation to the plaintiff.  The compensatory aspect 
of the private antitrust remedy drives the analysis. 
52 Professor Page argues that the compensation criterion is a subsidiary analysis.  That 
argument ignores that without compensation, there would be little to no private antitrust 
enforcement.  Although private plaintiffs can seek injunctive relief under Clayton Act § 16, 
15 U.S.C. § 25, private claims for injunctive relief are primarily used as add-ons to claims 
for damages. 
53 See William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
652 (1983). 
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liability,54 subject-matter jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust courts,55 the 
scope of the treble damages remedy,56 and standing for private 
antitrust plaintiffs57—operate to create, and to limit, the recovery 
available to a private antitrust plaintiff.  Of these, the prudential 
standing analysis is the best candidate for optimizing the remedies 
available to private plaintiffs in light of the purposes those remedies 
should serve.58 Whether and how remedies are to be administered 
depends largely on the prudential question which plaintiffs will be 
permitted to sue.59 
The problem presented by private enforcement is that plaintiffs 
are—and should be—motivated solely by their own best interests.60 
That issue does not arise in the context of public antitrust 
enforcement by the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade 
 
54 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. 
55 Subject-matter jurisdiction generally has been the repository of the extraterritoriality 
analysis.  See 15 U.S.C. § 6a (FTAIA); see generally infra notes 83-87 and accompanying 
text. 
56 See Clayton Act section 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). 
57 See Page, supra, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 1446-1447 (treating antitrust standing, the Illinois 
Brick doctrine, and the antitrust injury doctrine from Brunswick Corp. as “three major 
doctrines [that] have been called into service” to “set economically rational limits on the 
size of treble damage liability and on the frequency of antitrust litigation”).  Associated 
General Contractors treated these doctrines as elements of the standing analysis.  See 
Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 545. 
58 Cf. Page, supra, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 1450 (noting the “complementary relationship” of 
antitrust injury and standing “in approximating the standard of optimal deterrence”).  
Substantive standards for liability, subject-matter jurisdiction, and the scope of the treble 
damages remedy, which are the most firmly grounded in statute and the least malleable, are 
the least likely candidates for optimization. 
 This article does not contend, as some have before, that some level of optimal deterrence 
exists that encourages “efficient” antitrust violations.  See Page, supra, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 
1450-1458; William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 652 (1983).  Whether criminal or tortious conduct can ever be efficient seems 
primarily an issue for political debate.  Antitrust is not the only context in which Congress 
has seen fit, for reasons of its own, to impose economically inefficient penalties or civil 
liability. 
59 See Page, supra, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 1446-1447 (describing “three major doctrines” that 
are employed to “set economically rational limits on the size of treble damage liability and 
on the frequency of antitrust litigation.”  This article has argued that the three doctrines are 
subsumed into the Associated General Contractors standing analysis). 
60 See Page, supra, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 1445 (“firms quite rationally employ a rent-seeking 
antitrust strategy, whose aim is not only to exact treble damages, but to inhibit rivalry and 
efficient distribution practices”). 
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Commission.  The agencies in recent decades have undertaken their 
enforcement efforts with views toward the policies of economic 
efficiency most courts and commentators agree should be advanced 
by U.S. antitrust enforcement.61 But little incentive exists for private 
plaintiffs to limit their claims so the remedy does not result in too 
great of deterrence by the defendant.62 In private enforcement, then, 
courts are given the task of optimizing remedies.  That is a question 
of balancing concerns for over-deterrence (produced by excess 
compensation) and under-deterrence (the result of insufficient 
compensation). 
 Over-deterrence is the chilling of economically useful conduct 
through the specter of the liability that will be imposed if that useful 
conduct should cause harm.63 A standard of remedying harm that 
risks producing “false positives”—liability where no anticompetitive 
conduct actually took place—is bothersome twice over.  First, it 
imposes liability where none should be imposed.  Second, it prevents 
possible defendants from toeing the line between strident 
 
61 See generally William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy 
Enforcement Norms, 71 Antitrust L.J. 377 (2003).  As to the relevance of economic analysis 
to antitrust enforcement, see Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Introduction: The 
Intractable Problem of Antitrust Jurisdiction, in Competition Laws in Conflict: Antitrust 
Jurisdiction in a Global Economy 1, 1 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, eds., 2004). 
62 An exception might exist for a plaintiff that might find itself a defendant in future 
litigation raising the same issues.  Research has uncovered no analysis of the degree to 
which private plaintiffs consider their own potential future liability in their litigation 
decisions.  Such an analysis would be helpful in understanding parties’ litigation decisions. 
 Psychological factors are relevant here as well.  Private plaintiffs overvalue their claim 
because they might be blind to factors apart from the defendant’s conduct—such as 
mismanagement of their business—that caused or contributed to the harm they suffered.  
The massive incentives for private plaintiffs to engage in antitrust litigation overwhelm any 
hopes for self selection. 
63 One context in which the over-deterrence concern is found—that of unitary 
anticompetitive conduct in violation of section two of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2)—
has been much remarked.  See, e.g., Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (2d ed. 1993); 
Richard Posner, Antitrust Law (2d ed. 2001).  The over-deterrence concern in the case of 
collusive conduct made illegal by 15 U.S.C. § 1, like the price-fixing at issue in Empagran,
is that economically efficient joint-venture activity can be confused with per-se illegal 
activities. 
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competition, which is the essence of competition and therefore highly 
desirable, and anticompetitive activity.64 
The opposite concern from over-deterrence is that of under-
deterrence.  If the total liability stemming from anticompetitive 
conduct, discounted by the likelihood liability will be imposed at all, 
is less than the total expected benefit from the conduct, rational 
economic actors will engage in the conduct.65 Conversely, if the 
total liability appropriately discounted exceeds the total expected 
benefit, they will not.  The under-deterrence concern arises if either 
(1) the regulatory regime insufficiently penalizes conduct, or (2) the 
judicial system somehow fails to give full effect to the regulatory 
scheme. 
 A twist on the under-deterrence concern is an “inverse deterrence” 
argument that came to the fore in Empagran. Under the inverse 
deterrence argument, excessive private enforcement produces 
negative externalities that harm public enforcement efforts.  This 
harm occurs because public enforcement relies heavily on the 
Department of Justice’s leniency program to uncover criminal 
antitrust conspiracies.66 The leniency program permits the first cartel 
 
64 Differentiating between the acme of competitive conduct and anticompetitive conduct can 
be difficult or impossible.  By way of specific example in the context of unitary 
anticompetitive conduct, courts and noted commentators long have recognized that an effort 
to monopolize a market by defeating all of one’s competitors is economically desireable 
conduct.  See Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 509 U.S. 209, 227 
(1993); U.S. v. AMR Corp., 335 F.2d 1109, 1114-1115 (10th Cir. 2003) (“‘the mechanism 
by which a firm engages in predatory pricing-- lowering prices--is the same mechanism by 
which a firm stimulates competition’”) (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, 479 
U.S. 104, 122 (1986)).  But the predation cause of action exists when a dominant 
competitor goes too far.  The sheep of desireable conduct enough resembles the wolf of 
predation that engaging in the one might give rise to liability for the other. 
 The same rationale applies in the context of collusive conduct.  15 U.S.C. § 1.  For 
example, in Shell Oil Co. v. Dagher, the Ninth Circuit held that members of a concededly 
legal joint venture had fixed prices in violation of Sherman Act section one when they 
agreed on the price for a product produced by the joint venture.  The Supreme Court 
reversed.  Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 126 S. Ct. 1276 (2006).  The false positive in Dagher 
was the court of appeals’ confusion of the sheep of a procompetitive joint venture with the 
wolf of a price-fixing cartel. 
65 See Pfizer Corp., 434 U.S. at 315. 
66 See Brief of the United States and Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae, F. 
Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., S. Ct. No. 03-724, at 19-21.  See also Barnett, 
Presentation, supra, at 1 (describing the amnesty program as one of seven prongs of the 
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member to disclose the cartel and cooperate with prosecutors to 
avoid criminal prosecution.67 But it says nothing about civil liability 
that might follow.68 Excessive potential civil liability decreases the 
likelihood that avoiding criminal liability is a sufficient incentive for 
a member to disclose participation in a cartel.69 
 
B.  Analysis of the FTAIA 
 
Congress in 1982 recognized the burgeoning antitrust 
extraterritoriality issues.  It enacted the FTAIA70 to define the scope 
 
Department of Justice’s cartel enforcement strategy); id. at 6-7 (describing the operation and 
importance of DOJ’s amnesty program). 
67 See Department of Justice Corporate Leniency Policy (issued Aug. 10, 1993), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lencorp.htm. 
68 See Kruman, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 622.  The trial court in Christie’s noted: 
 
In January 2000, word leaked that Christie’s had availed itself of the 
amnesty program of the Antitrust Division of the United States 
Department of Justice and confessed that it had engaged in fixing prices 
of auction services with Sotheby’s.  As one might expect, a veritable 
flood of class actions was filed in response to this news, each seeking to 
recover damages under the United States antitrust laws on behalf of 
variously described classes of purchasers and sellers who bought or sold 
through these houses at non-internet auctions in the United States. 
 
Ibid. 
69 Then, and somewhat circularly, because of the prima facie effect of a criminal conviction 
of antitrust conduct in a private antitrust suit, the public enforcement efforts usually provide 
the driving force behind private suits.  So, according to the inverse deterrence argument, 
excessive potential civil liability can decrease the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement at 
all levels.  In effect, the inverse deterrence rationale threatens the same effect as under-
deterrence—reducing the regulatory scheme’s effectiveness at uncovering existing antitrust 
conspiracies. 
70 15 U.S.C. § 6a.  The FTAIA reads in full: 
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or 
commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign 
nations unless—  
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable 
effect—  
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign 
nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign 
nations; or 
SUBMISSION COPY 8/25/2006 2:36:03 PM
2006]      STANDING FOR EXTRATERRITORIALITY 18 
 
of appropriate extraterritorial application of the U.S. antitrust laws.   
The FTAIA received little attention for nearly two decades71—
perhaps because of its opacity,72 perhaps because it appeared merely 
to codify existing law,73 or perhaps because the global stage was not 
until recently set for the current wave of multinational litigation.  
Even the Supreme Court’s highly contentious 1993 extraterritoriality 
decision, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,74 relegated the 
FTAIA analysis to a footnote.75 In recent years, clever arguments by 
plaintiffs’ counsel have resuscitated the statute.76 
Like other statutes that memorialize limitations on courts’ 
power,77 the FTAIA first takes away courts’ authority over all 
 
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a 
person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United 
States; and 
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 
7 of this title, other than this section. 
If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the 
interpretation of paragraph (1)(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title shall 
apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the United 
States. 
71 See Delrahim, Remarks, supra, at 3 (“it lay almost unnoticed in dusty pages of the United 
States Code”) 
72 See ibid. (noting the underuse of the FTAIA “may have something to do with” the 
FTAIA’s “‘inelegant phras[ing]’”); 2 Spencer W. Waller, Antitrust & Am Business Abroad 
§ 13.23 (3d ed. Supp. 2005) (noting the “obscure and badly drafted Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act”). 
73 See, e.g., Empagran, 542 U.S. at 169 (“Congress designed the FTAIA to clarify, perhaps 
to limit, but not to expand in any significant way, the Sherman Act’s scope as applied to 
foreign commerce.”) (citing H.R. 97-686, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2487-
2488); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 n.23 (1993).. 
74 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
75 See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796 n.23. 
76 See, e.g., Statoil, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001); Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l P.L.C., 284 
F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002); Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003).  There is irony in plaintiffs’ counsel bringing this statute to the fore.  It was 
enacted to limit U.S. antitrust courts’ extraterritorial reach.  See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 169.  
See also The In Porters, S.A. v. Hanes Printables, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 494, 498 (M.D.N.C. 
1987) (noting that the statute was a response to complaints by American firms that the U.S. 
antitrust scheme made them less competitive on the world stage). 
77 Ready examples include the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 and the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611.  See MacArthur Area Citizens 
Ass’n v. Republic of Peru, 809 F.2d 918, 919-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (comparing the FTCA 
with the FSIA). 
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antitrust claims in wholly foreign or export commerce—then gives 
some back.  Congress provided the antitrust laws “shall not apply to 
conduct” involving wholly foreign commerce or export trade or 
export commerce, “unless” an exception is met.78 The exception is 
comprised of two primary parts.  Subsection (1) requires that for 
conduct to be within the reach of the antitrust laws, it must have “a 
direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic 
commerce, import commerce, or the business of U.S. exporters.79 
Subsection (2) requires further that the conduct “give rise to a claim” 
under the substantive antitrust laws.80 
The FTAIA codified a version of the common-law “effects test,” 
an analytic exercise to determine the reach of a court’s power to 
apply the antitrust laws.  Courts have rejected the bright-line of 
American Banana, which has been interpreted broadly to have held 
the U.S. antitrust laws do not address extraterritorial conduct.81 
Courts, most notably the Second Circuit in Alcoa,82 have held that if 
the extraterritorial conduct has a sufficient effect on U.S. commerce, 
a U.S. court will assert jurisdiction over an antitrust claim arising 
from that conduct.83 The legislative history of the FTAIA supports 
 
78 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (quoted in full supra n.19).  See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 162. 
79 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1).  See __ Spencer W. Waller, Antitrust & Am. Business Abroad __ (3d 
ed. Supp. 2005). 
80 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (referring to “sections 1 to 7 of this title, other than this section”) 
81 This interpretation overstates the holding of American Banana. The case is better 
understood as relying on the “act of state” doctrine in holding that the decision of Costa 
Rica to lend its support—including military support—to the defendants to give them a leg 
up on competitors could not be challenged.  Cf. McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd., 417 F.3d 107, 
120 n.8 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Notably, Steele [v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952)] cited 
American Banana and rejected a territorial interpretation of that case; it read American 
Banana as applying only when there were no effects in the United States from the foreign 
antitrust violation.”). 
82 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.).  In 
Alcoa, the Second Circuit sat as a court of last resort through a procedural quirk brought 
about by 4 recusals on the Supreme Court.  See id. at 421; 15 U.S.C. § 29 (statutory 
language enacted to permit certification specifically to Judge Hand).  The effects test in 
antitrust can be traced earlier to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Sisal Sales 
Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). 
83 The FTAIA codified an arguably more restrictive effects test in which the elements exist 
in the conjunctive: the overseas conduct must have “a direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect” on domestic U.S. commerce.  15 U.S.C. § 6a (emphasis added).  See 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).  Whether a “reasonably 
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the understanding that Congress intended the effects test to retain 
vitality.84 
 
II. IN EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION: UNDERSTANDING EMPAGRAN 
The Empagran litigation is the source of the modern rules 
governing extraterritoriality and an example of their application.  
Empagran was a private tag-along action after guilty pleas and record 
criminal fines in a prosecution of cartel members by the Antitrust 
Division.  The Empagran litigation came into the courts after cartel 
members had availed themselves of the leniency program.   
Primarily, though, Empagran was another example of efforts in the 
past decade by foreign plaintiffs to avail themselves of attractive U.S. 
antitrust laws and procedures. 
 The Empagran plaintiffs sued vitamin manufacturers alleging 
price fixing—a violation of section one of the Sherman Act that 
 
foreseeable” effect is the same as an intended effect is not clear.  See McBee v. Delica Co.,
417 F.3d 107, 120 n.9 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The FTAIA’s ‘reasonably foreseeable’ requirement 
appears to be related to this traditional intent requirement.”). 
 The “effects test” has analogs in many substantive legal schemes.  See, e.g., Bersch v. 
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 & n.24 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.) (“the federal 
securities laws * * * do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside the 
United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act) within the United States directly 
caused such losses”) (applying an “effects test” in the context of extraterritorial application 
of the U.S. securities laws); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 961 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(effects test in the securities law arena); McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 120-121 (1st 
Cir. 2005) (“substantial effects” test for extraterritorial Lanham Act jurisdiction); 
OSRecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe Int’l, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 357, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(applying an “effects test” in the context of a private RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 
1964, relying on Bersch and Empagran).  None of securities, RICO or the Lanham Act have 
a statutory analog to the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, however.  See In re 
Royal Ahold N.V. Securities Litig., 351 F. Supp. 2d 334, 356 n.10 (D. Md. 2004) (“the 
securities laws are silent as to extraterritoriality”); McBee, 417 F.3d at 121 (noting that 
Congress has not enacted an analog to the FTAIA in the trademark scheme).  An interesting 
analysis would consider the degree to which the arguments in this article apply more 
broadly to other substantive schemes that also rely on an effects test for determining the 
extent of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  Cf. Royal Ahold, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 356 (“I find 
[Empagran] both legally and factually distinguishable from the present [securities] 
dispute.”). 
84 See 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2487-2488, 2494-2495. 
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regularly gives rise to civil and criminal penalties85—on a worldwide 
scale.86 The plaintiffs, distributors of vitamins from around the 
globe, originally were a class of “foreign and domestic purchasers of 
vitamins.”87 
The defendants’ arguments for dismissing the foreign purchasers’ 
claims proceeded on two fronts.  First, defendants contended the 
FTAIA limited the court’s jurisdiction to claims of domestic harm 
felt as a result of the effect of antitrust-violative conduct on domestic 
U.S. commerce.88 Second, defendants contended the foreign 
purchasers lacked standing to sue.89 Under the antitrust standing 
approach, unless the plaintiffs suffered injuries flowing from that 
which makes the defendant’s acts unlawful—which, defendants’ 
argued, were the effects of the alleged conduct on U.S. commerce—
the plaintiff’s injuries should not be cognizable in a U.S. antitrust 
court.90 The district court dismissed the foreign plaintiffs’ claims 
“because the conspiracy’s effect on U.S. commerce did not cause the 
foreign purchasers’ injury.”91 It based its holding on a lack of subject 
 
85 15 U.S.C. § 1.  “Cartels are ‘the supreme evil of antitrust.’The fixing of prices, bids, 
output, and markets by cartels has no plausible efficiency justification; therefore, antitrust 
authorities properly regard cartel behavior as per se illegal or a "hard core" violation of the 
competition laws.”  Assistant Attorney General Thomas O. Barnett, Seven Steps to Better 
Cartel Enforcement, 11th Annual Competition Law & Policy Workshop 1 (June 2, 2006) 
(Presentation), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/216453.pdf; Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General Thomas O. Barnett, Antitrust Enforcement Priorities: A Year in 
Review, Fall Forum of the Section of Antitrust Law 1 (Nov. 19, 2004) (Priorities) (noting 
that “the highest enforcement priority is rooting out and prosecuting illegal cartels—naked 
agreements not to compete”), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/206455.pdf.  See also, e.g., Richard A. Posner, 
The Chicago School Of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925, 933 (1979) (noting that 
the most conservative commentators argued for enforcement only of price fixing and 
mergers to monopoly); John E. Lopatka & William F. Page, Monopolization, Innovation 
and Consumer Welfare, 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 367, 388 (2001) (arguing in support of 
presumptive unlawfulness of horizontal price fixing). 
86 Empagran, 315 F.3d at 340. 
87 Id. at 342. 
88 See Empagran, 2001 WL 761360, at *2; Empagran, 315 F.3d at 343. 
89 See Empagran, 2001 WL 761360, at *_5; Empagran, 315 F.3d at 341. 
90 See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petition for Rehearing En Banc 8-9, Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche 
Ltd., D.C. Cir. No. 01-7115 (filed Mar. 24, 2003) (Government D.C. Cir. Brief). 
91 Id. at 343. 
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matter jurisdiction and did not reach defendants’ standing 
argument.92 After procedural wrangling, only the foreign purchasers’ 
claims, alleging harm suffered in Australia, Ecuador, Panama and the 
Ukraine, were before the courts on appeal.  Defendants pressed those 
same arguments to the D.C. Circuit.93 
 
A.  Literalist Statutory Construction and Worldwide Conspiracy 
 
Plaintiffs advanced two theories under which the FTAIA might 
permit the assertion of jurisdiction over their claims.  The first was a 
broad reading of the extent of extraterritorial jurisdiction permitted 
by the FTAIA.  Plaintiffs argued under this theory that jurisdiction 
could be had over any suit alleging harm flowing from antitrust-
violative conduct, so long as the conduct also had some effect in 
domestic commerce.94 Plaintiffs further argued the effect in 
domestic U.S. commerce need have no connection to their harm. 
 Plaintiffs’ broad theory found primary traction in a literalist 
interpretation of the language Congress employed in the FTAIA.95 
Under subsection (2) of the statute, for extraterritorial jurisdiction to 
be available, the complained-of conduct must have an appropriate 
effect on U.S. commerce, and “such effect” must “give[] rise to a 
claim” under the antitrust laws.96 Defendants argued the conduct 
alleged must give rise to the plaintiff’s claim.  Plaintiffs argued the 
 
92 See Empagran, 315 F.3d at 343. 
93 See id. at 344, 357 (statutory interpretation and standing arguments, respectively). 
 After the court of appeals reversed the district court and reinstated the foreign purchasers’ 
claims, the United States and the Federal Trade Commission filed a brief as amici curiae 
supporting defendants’ ultimately unsuccessful effort at en banc review.  See Government 
D.C. Cir. Brief.  The government brief echoed both the statutory and the standing 
arguments.  It also combined the arguments, arguing—in a foreshadowing of the Supreme 
Court’s ultimate analysis—that “principles of antitrust injury and standing” are “embedded 
in the FTAIA.”  Id. at 8-9. 
94 Empagran, 315 F.3d at 344 (inquiring whether “it [is] enough for a plaintiff to show that 
the anticompetitive effects of the defendant’s conduct on U.S. commerce give rise to an 
antitrust claim under the Sherman Act by someone, even if not by the plaintiff who is before 
the court”). 
95 This sort of careful statutory analysis has only recently gained traction in antitrust 
decisionmaking.  See, e.g., Empagran, 542 U.S. at 173-174; Volvo Trucks North America, 
Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 126 S. Ct. __ (2006). 
96 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2). 
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conduct alleged must only give rise to a claim. It is not difficult to 
appreciate why the plaintiffs’ proffered interpretation appeared to 
give proper effect to Congress’s use in subsection (2) of the 
indefinite article “a,” rather than the definite article “the.” 
 In an earlier case, Kruman v. Christie’s International PLC,97 the 
Second Circuit had accepted a variation of the broad theory of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.  The Kruman court instead held that the 
conduct complained of need only have violated the substantive 
provisions of the Sherman Act, and need not have caused any harm 
in U.S. commerce.98 “A claim” might include a claim that could be 
brought by the enforcement authorities, which have no obligation to 
demonstrate harm to seek injunctive relief and criminal penalties for 
violation of the antitrust laws.99 
The D.C. Circuit in Empagran interpreted “a claim” to mean a 
claim by a private plaintiff.  Thus, some plaintiff must have suffered 
harm in domestic U.S. commerce from the effect of the conduct.  The 
foreign plaintiffs’ claims would then be derivative of that domestic 
plaintiff’s claim. 
 The Empagran plaintiffs’ second theory became the Empagran 
exception. Under this theory, if the FTAIA permitted jurisdiction 
only over claims with a nexus to an effect on domestic U.S. 
commerce, plaintiffs’ claims might nonetheless be cognizable. 
Plaintiffs argued the defendants had been engaged in a worldwide 
price-fixing conspiracy, in which all conduct was interdependent on 
all other conduct.100 The court of appeals described the 
interdependence theory as one of a possibility of arbitrage by third 
parties purchasing at competitive prices in one location and selling 
below the fixed price level in another or by would-be purchasers in 
 
97 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002). 
98 See Kruman, 284 F.3d at 399-400; Empagran, 315 F.3d at 348 (discussing the Second 
Circuit’s holding in Kruman). 
99 See 15 U.S.C. § 4; Empagran, 542 U.S. at 170-171 (noting the distinction between 
private plaintiffs and government plaintiffs is that government plaintiffs need not show 
standing). 
100 “Respondents contend that, because vitamins are fungible and readily transportable, 
without an adverse domestic effect (i.e., higher prices in the United States), the sellers could 
not have maintained their international price-fixing arrangement and respondents would not 
have suffered their foreign injury.”  Empagran, 542 U.S. at 175. 
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price-fixed markets purchasing instead in competitive markets and 
importing to their home markets.101 
The interdependence theory is not new.  In DeAtucha v.
Commodity Exchange, Inc.,102 the plaintiff alleged that “‘because of 
the fungibility of silver and silver futures, the United States market 
* * * and the London Exchange function from an economic 
standpoint as a single market.’”103 “DeAtucha’s theory of standing, 
as we understand it, is that he may sue under American antitrust laws 
because the defendants’ manipulation of the American silver markets 
produced his injury on the [London Exchange].”104 
Economic theory supports an allegation that, in a worldwide 
conspiracy, stable prices in a particular geographic locale is essential 
to maintaining stable prices in others.105 Successful cartels only can 
exist in environments that permit the members to detect “cheating”—
that is, pricing below the agreed cartel price in an effort to gain 
market share.106 Cheating in a worldwide market seemingly could 
occur if one producer arranged to sell to distributors in a non-price-
fixed market, enabling those distributors to move the product to their 
home markets on their own initiative.  Fixing prices in every market 
in which the cartel members compete is a sure way to avoid this form 
of cheating.   
 The related arbitrage concern argued by the plaintiffs throughout 
the Empagran litigation, and noted by the D.C. Circuit, is that even 
independent of cheating by participants in the cartel, distributors or 
third parties could take advantage of lower prices in one geographic 
 
101 Empagran, 417 F.3d at 1270-1271. 
102 608 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
103 DeAtucha, 608 F. Supp. at 511 (quoting plaintiff’s complaint, ¶ 28). 
104 Id. at 513. 
105 See Connor, Staff Paper 04-08, supra, at 6 (noting the likelihood of geographic 
arbitrage in the world market for vitamins at issue in Empagran). 
106 See Katherine M. McElroy & John J. Siegfried, The Economics of Price Fixing, in 
Economic Analysis and Antitrust Law 139, 143 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried, eds., 2d 
ed. 1988) (conditions required to stabilize cartels); George Stigler, ___, in Economic 
Analysis and Antitrust Law __, 149 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried, eds., 2d ed. 1988) 
(cheating is incentivized). 
SUBMISSION COPY--NOT FOR CIRCULATION OR DISTRIBUTION 8/25/2006 2:36:03 PM
25 _______ LAW REVIEW [Vol. __:_ 
 
market to move product on their own from a lower-priced, 
competitive market to a fixed-price one.107 
On the other hand, strong reason exists to believe maintaining a 
worldwide conspiracy is sufficiently difficult that localized price-
fixing behavior is much more likely.  The larger the scope of the 
conspiracy, the more difficult and expensive is reaching agreement 
among cartel members as to prices and market shares in the diverse 
geographic locales within the scope of the conspiracy and monitoring 
the behavior of co-conspirators.108 Additionally, a worldwide 
conspiracy might involve too many players with too diverse of 
interests and corporate cultures to be maintainable at all.109 Those 
factors seem at least as likely to undermine any arguments of global 
interdependence in a worldwide cartel as the cheating and arbitrage 
arguments are to bolster them.110 
On the initial appeal from the trial court, the D.C. Circuit did not 
address plaintiffs’ theory of worldwide independence.111 Neither did 
the Second Circuit in Kruman inquire into the existence of a causal 
connection.112 By contrast, the Fifth Circuit, in Den Norske Stats 
Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac V.O.F. (Statoil),113 did address the 
 
107 A thorough analysis of this effect is found in Connor, Staff Paper 04-08, supra.
108 See. McElroy & Siegfried, Price Fixing, supra, at 146-147 (discussing the difficulties 
of fine-tuning fixed prices among participants in a cartel). 
109 See id. at 148 (necessity for a sufficiently small number of firms to permit control of 
cheating on a price agreement). 
 One criticism of the foregoing assertions is that geographic breadth of a cartel is less 
important than sheer size as far as goes the challenges of maintaining solidarity among its 
members.  Research has not uncovered analysis of which factor—size of cartel/numerosity 
of participants or geographic breadth—is more important.  But surely they are not 
independent qualities.  A cartel of great geographic scope is likely to be larger than one that 
is purely local.  Also, geographic scope does present particularized challenges.  Those 
would include some of the same language and culture barriers that accompany all cross-
border business dealings. 
110 But see Connor, Staff Paper 04-08, supra, at 7-10 (arguing the vitamins cartel at issue in 
Empagran was vast and sophisticated). 
111 Empagran, 315 F.3d at 341. 
112 Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 399-400 (2d Cir. 2002) (FTAIA relates 
to conduct, not to the injury; injury is governed by Clayton Act Section 4). 
113 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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causal connection between domestic effect and foreign injury.114 
That court held “the critical portion of the FTAIA at issue” was the 
requirement that “the domestic effect on commerce ‘gives rise’ to the 
antitrust claim.”115 The plaintiff had argued that “the market * * * is 
a single, unified, global market.”116 But “the FTAIA requires more 
than a ‘close relationship’ between the domestic injury and the 
plaintiff’s claim; it demands that the domestic effect ‘gives rise’ to 
the claim.”117 Because the plaintiffs apparently failed to plead any 
causal connection, the court did not have occasion to define what 
degree of nexus would be required for a harm felt in domestic U.S. 
commerce to confer authority on a U.S. antitrust court to decide a 
suit over a derivative foreign harm. 
 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Analysis of the FTAIA 
 
The Supreme Court held the FTAIA precluded the assertion of 
jurisdiction by U.S. courts to remedy wholly foreign harm with no 
nexus to an effect in U.S. commerce.118 Empagran came to the 
Supreme Court by way of a split among the Courts of Appeals.  The 
Fifth Circuit, in Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. Heeremac VOF 
(Statoil), 241 F.3D 420 (5th Cir. 2001), held that U.S. antitrust courts’ 
jurisdiction did not extend to harm suffered in foreign commerce.  
The Second Circuit in the Christie’s Auction House litigation, 
Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002), 
reached the opposite conclusion.  The D.C. Circuit in Empagran 
aligned itself close to Kruman, holding that the foreign plaintiffs’ 
claims could be heard in U.S. antitrust courts.  Empagran, 315 F.3d 
at 350.  Interpreting statutory subsection (1), the Court held the 
complained-of conduct must have had a direct, substantial and 
 
114 Statoil, 241 F.3d at 425 (noting argument that “Statoil’s injury in the North Sea was a 
‘necessary prerequisite to’ and was ‘the quid pro quo for’ the injury suffered in the United 
States domestic market”). 
115 241 F.3d at 424 n.13 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2)). 
116 Id. at 425. 
117 Id. at 427. 
118 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 159. 
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reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic commerce, import 
commerce, or on the business of U.S. exporters.119 Interpreting 
statutory subsection (2), the Court held the conduct’s effect on 
domestic U.S. commerce must have given rise to the plaintiff’s 
claims under the antitrust laws.120 The Court left an exception for 
claims of foreign harm with a sufficient nexus to the effect on U.S. 
commerce and remanded the case for the D.C. Circuit to determine 
whether that exception had been met.121 
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit on plaintiffs’ 
literalist theory.  It held that plaintiffs must do more than merely 
allege the defendant’s antitrust-violative conduct gave rise to “a” 
claim under the antitrust laws.  Plaintiffs must allege that the conduct 
gave rise to “the” claim that formed the basis of their lawsuit.122 
Two primary rationales supported the interpretation.123 First, the 
Court relied on the statutory interpretive principle of prescriptive 
comity to construe any ambiguity in the FTAIA “to avoid 
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other 
nations.”124 Second, the Court was convinced from a read of the 
 
119 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 162 (interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)).  Section 6a(1) literally 
requires that for conduct is within the purview of a U.S. antitrust court only if “such conduct 
has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect (A) on trade or commerce which 
is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with 
foreign nations; or (B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person 
engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States.” 
120 See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 162 (interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2)).  Section 6a(2) literally 
requires that, once a plaintiff has demonstrated the requisite effect to meet the first element 
of the FTAIA, the plaintiff prove also that “such effect gives rise to a claim under the 
provisions of sections 1 to 7 of this title, other than this section.  If sections 1 to 7 of this 
title apply to such conduct only because of the operation of paragraph (1)(B), then sections 
1 to 7 of this title shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the 
United States.” 
121 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 175. 
122 Id. at 174.  No confusion exists as to this part of the Court’s holding.  See, e.g., Sniado 
v. Bank Austria A.G., 378 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2004), on remand from 542 U.S. 917 (2004), 
vacating and remanding in light of Empagran.  In Sniado, the plaintiffs had not alleged any 
nexus between a domestic effect of overseas conduct and their foreign injuries.  The Second 
Circuit held that in light of Empagran, the complaint must be dismissed.  Id. at 213. 
123 See generally Cavanaugh, 58 S.M.U. L. REV., supra, at 1429. 
124 542 U.S. at 164 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,
372 U.S. 10 (1963)). 
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language and legislative history of the FTAIA that the statute 
narrowed, rather than broadened, the scope of extraterritorial 
application of the U.S. antitrust laws vis-a-vis the state of the law 
before its enactment.125 
Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment only.  They 
would have relied solely on the text of the FTAIA, interpreted in the 
light of “the principle that statutes should be read in accord with the 
customary deference to the application of foreign countries’ laws 
within their own territories”—that is, the prescriptive comity 
canon126 
 
1.  Prescriptive Comity 
 
Under the prescriptive comity rationale, the Court paid 
exceptional respect to concerns for the possible harm to international 
comity from U.S. antitrust courts’ jurisdictional overreaching.  The 
presence in the litigation of several foreign government amici figured 
prominently in the opinion.127 
On prescriptive comity generally, see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 
812-822 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).  Under this doctrine, “‘an act of congress 
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
remains.’” Id. at 814-815 (quoting Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsey, 2 Cranch 64, 
118 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.).  “Though it clearly has constitutional authority to do so, 
Congress is generally presumed not to have exceeded those customary international-law 
limits on jurisdiction to prescribe.”  Id. at 815. 
125 542 U.S. at 169.  The opinion qualified this discussion as helpful “to those who find 
legislative history useful.”  Id. at 163.  Writing for six Justices, Justice Breyer appears to be 
referring in this passage to a concurrence in which Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, 
concurred in the judgment by relying solely on the text of the statute and canons of 
construction.  See 542 U.S. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring).  See generally Max Huffman, 
Review Essay: Using All Available Information, 25 REVIEW OF LITIGATION 501, __ (2006) 
(noting the regularity with which Justices Breyer and Scalia concur in each other’s opinions, 
advancing their own views of the statutory interpretive process). 
126 542 U.S. at 176. 
127 See 542 U.S. at 167-169 (citing to briefs filed by the governments of Germany, Canada 
and Japan). 
 Foreign government amicus involvement has been an untold story of recent Supreme 
Court Terms.  In the 2004 Term (a year after Empagran was decided), amicus The Bahamas 
was permitted to present argument supporting respondent Norwegian Cruise Lines.  See 
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Lines Ltd., ___.  An interesting analysis might compare 
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The emphasis on comity was an about-face from the Court’s 
opinion eleven years previous in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California.128 In Hartford Fire, the Court held on an analysis of the 
effects test that a U.S. court should exercise jurisdiction over a claim 
of overseas conspiracies with effects in U.S. markets.129 “Even 
assuming that in a proper case a court may decline to exercise 
Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign conduct * * *, international 
comity would not counsel against exercising jurisdiction in the 
circumstances alleged here.”130 By contrast, in Empagran, all eight 
voting Justices agreed that comity considerations were controlling.  
Despite that about face, the Court in Empagran did not explicitly cast 
doubt on the Hartford Fire rule.131 What the Court did do is elevate 
the comity question from an afterthought in Hartford Fire to a 
preeminent decision rationale in Empagran.132 
The fulcrum of the prescriptive comity analysis in Empagran was 
this: stepping on toes internationally is acceptable to protect domestic 
commerce.  It is not acceptable in order to protect wholly foreign 
commerce.133 The opinion contrasted the case of application of U.S. 
antitrust laws to foreign commerce to redress domestic injury with 
the same overseas application to redress foreign injury.134 In each 
situation, extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction raises comity concerns 
 
foreign government participation with the debate over the use of foreign authority in federal 
judicial opinions. 
128 509 U.S. 764 (1993).  See Hannah Buxbaum, National Courts, Global Cartels: F. 
Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (U.S. Supreme Court 2004), 5 German L. Rev. 
1095, 1101 (2004) (discussing Empagran as evidence of a “renewed interest on the part of 
the Supreme Court in using principles of comity to confine the extraterritorial reach of U.S. 
antitrust law”). 
129 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Cf. McBee v. Delica Corp., 417 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005) (relying on both Empagran and 
Hartford Fire). 
132 See Buxbaum, 5 German L. Rev., supra, at 1102 (Empagran “signals acceptance of the 
notion that comity operates actually to limit the reach of U.S. law to foreign conduct”). 
133 Id. at 1100 (“the principle of non-interference is not absolute.  Statutes must be 
construed to prevent unreasonable interference—but, as the Court notes, sometimes 
interference with foreign sovereign authority is justified”). 
134 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165.  Cf. Cavanaugh, 56 S.M.U. L. REV., supra, at 2159-2180 
(listing “concrete factual scenarios in which jurisdictional issues arise”—combinations of 
foreign or domestic conduct and foreign or domestic harm). 
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by “interfer[ing] with a foreign nation’s ability independently to 
regulate its own commercial affairs.”135 In the case of domestic 
injury, the Court held it is “reasonable” to apply our laws to regulate 
the foreign conduct.136 But in the case of foreign injury, the Court 
held “the justification for that interference” with the foreign nation’s 
regulatory authority “seems insubstantial.”137 Empagran can read as 
a definitive modern statement that the policies of the U.S. antitrust 
scheme support the protection of U.S. commerce.  Understood this 
way, the opinion teaches that comity considerations are an analysis 
that should be undertaken as part of the prudential standing inquiry, 
which seeks to limit private suit to shoe cases in which U.S. antitrust 
policies are advanced.138 
 
2.  Statutory Interpretation 
The statutory interpretive analysis in Empagran initially involved 
a conclusion that the FTAIA was meant “to clarify, perhaps to limit, 
but not to expand in any significant way, the Sherman Act’s scope as 
applied to foreign commerce.”139 The Court found no cases prior to 
 
135 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165.   
136 Id. at 165.  See Buxbaum, 5 German L. Rev., supra, at 1103. 
137 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165. 
138 One commentator, addressing the Empagran Court’s prescriptive comity analysis, 
concludes that it foreordained the D.C. Circuit’s holding on remand.  Cavanagh, 58 S.M.U. 
L. Rev., supra, at 1437.  According to this argument, when the D.C. Circuit analyzed 
plaintiffs’ claims under the Empagran exception, it was required to hold no subject-matter 
jurisdiction exists because of comity concerns.  Id. at 1434.  That analysis overlooks two 
things: (1) the Court’s use of the word “reasonable” to describe the degree of interference 
with foreign nations’ sovereign authority over matters implicating their own domestic 
commerce (Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165-166), and (2) the continuing vitality of Court’s 
decision in Hartford Fire. Far from condemning all efforts to bring claims of harm in 
foreign commerce in U.S. antitrust courts, one can infer from Empagran a weighing of the 
degree of impingement on foreign sovereignty against the interests of the United States in 
the enforcement of its laws.  See 542 U.S. at 165 (“application of our antitrust laws to 
foreign anticompetitive conduct is nonetheless reasonable, and hence consistent with 
principles of prescriptive comity, insofar as they reflect a legislative effort to redress 
domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive conduct has caused”).  The latter is a 
question of the degree to which the harm plaintiffs allege reflects an effect on U.S. 
commerce. 
139 542 U.S. at 169.  For this conclusion, the Court relied solely on the legislative history of 
the FTAIA.  See ibid. (citing 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2487-2488). 
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the FTAIA’s 1982 enactment in which private plaintiffs had been 
able to seek redress for foreign injury suffered in foreign 
commerce.140 If it had been so before, and the FTAIA had either left 
unchanged or further limited the scope of the antitrust laws’ 
extraterritorial reach, it would be difficult to demonstrate a basis for 
jurisdiction over a claim of foreign harm post-FTAIA.141 
The Court rejected of the lower court’s literalist reading of the 
FTAIA.142 This rejection is surprising because of the apparent ease 
with which it was reached.  The literalist interpretation hews closely 
to the plain language of the FTAIA.  Section 6a(1) permits suit in a 
U.S. antitrust court if the complained-of conduct “gives rise to a 
claim” under the substantive antitrust laws.143 
 The Court held the conduct must give rise to the claim—that of 
the plaintiff suing—rather than just any claim.144 Neither the Court 
nor the concurrence made any effort to construe away Congress’s 
choice of the indefinite article “a,”  noting respondents’ “linguistic 
logic.”145 It acknowledged “respondents’ linguistic arguments might 
show that respondents’ reading is the more natural reading of the 
statutory language.”146 In concurrence, Justice Scalia—famous for 
 
140 Id. at 169-170. 
141 Id. at 170-171. 
142 Id. at 173-175. 
143 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2).  See supra nn. 72-87 and accompanying text (describing the FTAIA). 
144 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 174-175. 
145 Id. at 174. 
146 Ibid. The majority was comfortable that notions of prescriptive comity overcame the 
statute’s plain language.  Id. at 175 (majority opinion). 
 Again, an argument has been made that this reasoning precluded a decision for the 
plaintiffs on remand.  “Clearly, plaintiffs’ alternative theory”—what this article has termed 
their theory of worldwide interdependence—“would expand antitrust jurisdiction, since they 
have cited no decisions that upheld Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign transactions on 
their * * * theory before the FTAIA’s enactment.”  Cavanaugh, 58 S.M.U. L. REV., supra, at 
1434.  That analysis ignores the story of extraterritoriality of commerce, remarked numerous 
times by courts and commentators, over the decades since the FTAIA was enacted in 1982.  
Increasing interdependence of world markets increases the likelihood that a foreign harm 
will flow from a domestic effect.  The fact that plaintiffs prior to 1982 had been 
unsuccessful making those allegations does little to inform the likelihood of success of that 
argument on remand in Empagran II, and even less to inform the likelihood of success of 
that argument under the Empagran exception going forward. 
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his “textualist” statutory interpretive philosophy147—“concur[red] in 
the judgment of the Court because the language of the statute is 
readily susceptible of the interpretation the Court provides.”148 
 
C.  What Empagran Did Not Do 
 
The Court refused to create a bright-line rule prohibiting suits by 
foreign plaintiffs injured in foreign commerce and noted that its 
decision did not preclude further consideration on remand.149 
Instead, the Court declined to address plaintiffs’ worldwide 
conspiracy argument. 
 
We have assumed that the anticompetitive conduct 
here independently caused foreign injury; that is, the 
conduct's domestic effects did not help to bring about 
that foreign injury. * * *  Respondents contend that, 
because vitamins are fungible and readily 
transportable, without an adverse domestic effect (i.e., 
higher prices in the United States), the sellers could 
not have maintained their international price-fixing 
arrangement and respondents would not have suffered 
their foreign injury. * * * 
 The Court of Appeals, however, did not address this 
argument * * *, and, for that reason, neither shall 
we.150 
 
147 See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (1997).  See 
also Huffman, Review Essay: Using All Available Information, 25 Review of Litigation 501 
(2006). 
148 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 176 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia was swayed by 
principles of “deference to the application of foreign countries’ laws within their own 
territories.”  Ibid. 
149 Id. at 175. 
150 Ibid. 
Throughout the opinion the Court took great pains to make clear that it “base[d] its 
decision” on the assumption that “the adverse foreign effect is independent of any adverse 
domestic effect.”  Empagran, 542 U.S. at 175.  (This caveat was repeated in some form or 
another __ times in the opinion.)  See, e.g., id. at 165 (“why is it reasonable to apply those 
laws to foreign conduct insofar as that conduct causes independent foreign harm and that 
foreign harm alone gives rise to the plaintiff’s claim?”) (emphasis in original). 
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The avenue of argument the Court left for plaintiffs to allege their 
harm in foreign commerce was caused by the effects of the 
defendant’s conduct in U.S. commerce is the Empagran exception.  
And the Court did nothing to define its contours.151 
Where the statutory exception to the FTAIA’s blanket prohibition 
“gives back,”152 the Empagran exception gives back some more.  
The Empagran exception demonstrates the Court’s appreciation that 
the state of multinational commerce has not remained constant since 
the FTAIA was enacted in 1982 and will continue to develop going 
forward.  A rule imposing an inflexible approach as to the geographic 
scope of courts’ extraterritorial reach would not accommodate 
changing circumstances.153 In the Empagran exception, the Court 
permitted ongoing analysis of the kinds of harms cognizable under 
U.S. antitrust laws. 
 
D.  What Really Happened in Empagran 
 
The Empagran Court did not mention, let alone discuss or decide, 
the standing arguments decided by the D.C. Circuit, discussed by 
other courts and commentators, and pressed by the parties and amici.
151 See In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 2005-1 Trade Cas. ¶ 74,781, 2005 
WL 1080790, at *1 (D. Minn. May 2, 2005) (“the Supreme Court expressly declined to 
address the issue presented in this case: whether subject matter jurisdiction exists when a 
plaintiff’s foreign injury is allegedly linked to the domestic effects of the allegedly anti-
competitive conduct”). 
152 See supra n. 79 and accompanying text. 
153 In fact, decisions since Empagran have held allegations of worldwide interdependence 
sufficient to meet the Empagran exception and to survive motions to dismiss.  See infra nn. 
194-219 and accompanying text.  In other words, courts before Empagran had not been 
faced with allegations of a truly interdependent worldwide cartel.  See Connor, Staff Paper 
04-08, supra, at 7 (arguing the vitamins cartel was sui generis); John M. Connor, Private 
International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, and Anticartel Enforcement 1 (2003) (“The 
international cartels discovered and prosecuted since 1995 are qualitatively different from 
those operating during the interwar period.  They are truly global cartels and as such 
represent the ultimate stage in the evolution of the cartel as a form of business enterprise.”).  
Empagran made explicit that no reason exists why sufficient allegations of worldwide 
interdependence could not permit a suit alleging foreign harm to proceed.  542 U.S. at 175.  
And economic theory, discussed above, supports those holdings.   See supra nn. 109-111 
and accompanying text. 
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The reasons for that failure are unclear.154 The standing analysis was 
ripe for decision in Empagran. The question had been addressed 
(and the standing argument rejected) by the court of appeals 
below.155 It had been fully briefed by the parties and amici and was 
the subject of argument by the United States as amicus.156 
Nonetheless, good reason exists to understand Justice Breyer’s 
opinion in Empagran as following the antitrust standing rationale.157 
154 The opinion’s author, Justice Breyer, has been called the Court’s primary antitrust 
thinker.  See Huffman, 25 Rev. Litig., supra, at 514 n.49.  Certainly he was able to follow 
the antitrust standing argument and apply it if he preferred.  Other Members of the 
Empagran Court had written important opinions in standing cases.  See, e.g., Associated 
General Contractors, 459 U.S. 519 (Stevens, J.); Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 
U.S. 465, 485 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 493 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
155 See Empagran, 315 F.3d at 357-359. 
156 One commentator has suggested that the failure to rely on standing as a decision 
rationale reflects a desire to let the issue percolate further before it becomes the basis for 
decision.  Cavanaugh, supra, 58 S.M.U. L. Rev. at 1431.  That explanation is misguided for 
two reasons.  First, the antitrust injury doctrine was established in Brunswick without 
significant underlying percolation in the courts of appeals.  The primary discussion of 
antitrust standing as a decision principle had come from an article the year before by 
Professor Areeda.  Areeda, 89 Harv. L. Rev., supra. By contrast, when Empagran was 
decided, not only was antitrust standing doctrine well established, its application in the 
extraterritoriality framework had been analyzed by lower courts, including the D.C. Circuit 
in Empagran, and by noted commentators.  See Empagran, 315 F.3d at 357-359; Statoil,
241 F.3d 420, 431 n.32 (5th Cir. 2001); deAtucha v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 608 F. 
Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); 1 Waller, supra, § 9.7 (noting the relevance of standing issues 
in the FTAIA context); Cavanagh, 56 S.M.U. L. Rev., supra, at 2187-2188.  Second, the 
Court regularly signals its refusal to decide an issue not decided by the courts below—in 
fact, it refused to define the scope of the Empagran exception, preferring to let the D.C. 
Circuit decide that issue first—but it did not do so with regard to standing.  See Empagran,
542 U.S. at 175.  See also, e.g., Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., __ S. Ct. __ (2006) (“We 
decline to consider Ideal’s § 1962(a) claim without the benefit of the Court of Appeals’ 
analysis * * *.”).  
157 At oral argument by the government amici in support of petitioners, the standing 
argument received a somewhat ignominious reception.  Then-acting Assistant Attorney 
General R. Hewitt Pate argued, “with respect to the foreign-incurred injuries, [the foreign 
plaintiff] must show injury by reason of that which makes the conduct illegal, and since 
Alcoa in [1945], and certainly under Hartford, it is the effect on U.S. commerce that make 
the conduct the concern of the Sherman Act.”  Argument Tr. 19, F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. 
v. Empagran S.A., S. Ct. No. 03-724 (argued April 26, 2004) (citing United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (1945) (Hand, J.); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,
509 U.S. 764 (1993)).  See also Brief of the United States and Federal Trade Commission as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners __-__, F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,
S. Ct. No. 03-724; Brief of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Organization for 
International Investment as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners 13-22, F. Hoffman-
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The failure to address standing reflects the narrowness of the 
Court’s opinion.  Foreign harm with no connection to an effect on 
U.S. commerce—the only direct application of the opinion—does not 
raise difficult prudential issues.  The Court had no need to rely on a 
prudential doctrine.  That standing doctrine underlies Empagran is 
made clear by a structural analysis of the FTAIA and by examining 
three features of the Court’s opinion interpreting the statute. 
 
1.  The FTAIA Preserved the Standing Doctrine 
 
The Second Circuit in Kruman noted the essential distinction 
between the substantive provisions of the U.S. antitrust scheme—
what the FTAIA refers to as “sections 1 to 7 of this title”158—and the 
right of action provisions, which include Clayton Act section 4, the 
basis for the antitrust standing inquiry.159 The Second Circuit’s 
careful analysis of the structure of the U.S. antitrust laws and its 
broad extraterritoriality holding did nothing to prejudice defendants’ 
abilities to argue a lack of standing in that case.160 
LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., S. Ct. No. 03-724.  Justice Stevens—the author of 
Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. 519, and an important dissent in Blue Shield of 
Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 493 (1982)—queried in response: “I don’t follow the 
[argument].”  Ibid. Because the transcript was taken before individual questioners were 
identified, the Empagran argument transcript does not identify Justice Stevens as the 
questioner.  Additionally, due to an interruption by another Justice, the transcript does not 
finish the question.  The article fills in the blanks with observations from one who was 
present in the gallery for argument. 
158 15 U.S.C. § 6a. 
159 Cavanaugh, supra, 56 S.M.U. L. REV. at 2175.  This distinction was lost on the D.C. 
Circuit in Empagran.
160 Kruman, 284 F.3d at 403 (remanding to the trial court to decide the standing issue in 
the first instance). 
 Determining what might have happened in Kruman on remand may be a process of 
reading tea leaves, but there is ample indication in the district court’s opinion that it would 
have dismissed plaintiffs’ claims on remand on the grounds of antitrust standing.  Judge 
Kaplan of the Southern District of New York observed the distinction on which the Second 
Circuit relied between illegal conduct and the private right to a remedy.   
 
[I]t is perfectly appropriate for the United States to punish the 
conspiracy—the formation and continuation of the illicit agreement—
because it took place in substantial part in this country * * *.  But it 
would be appropriate for the United States to provide remedies for 
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The Kruman analysis is a highly defensible interpretation of the 
FTAIA in light of a broader understanding of the U.S. antitrust 
scheme.  The Kruman court understood the FTAIA as a jurisdictional 
provision that spoke to the type of conduct forbidden—conduct that 
violates the U.S. antitrust laws—rather than to the type of plaintiff 
that may bring suit to remedy harm caused by that conduct.161 This 
understanding of the FTAIA relies on a separation in the U.S. 
antitrust scheme between the substantive, jurisdictional provisions 
and the right of action provision contained in the Clayton Act.162 
By contrast, the D.C. Circuit approach in Empagran ignored the 
careful distinction in the antitrust laws between the conduct standards 
and the private right of action provision, specifically rejecting 
arguments that the schemes should be treated separately.163 That 
court treated the FTAIA as a hybrid provision that spoke to both the 
type of conduct over which suit is cognizable and the type of plaintiff 
that is permitted to sue.164 The FTAIA does contain a bare glimmer 
of support for that interpretation in its explicit textual reference to the 
 
injuries suffered in consequence of overt acts that occurred outside this 
country only if those acts, either individually or perhaps collectively, 
had direct, substantial and reasonable effects here that caused the 
injuries to be remedied.   
Kruman, 129 F. Supp. at 625-626.  (The quoted passage reflects looseness in the court’s use 
of the phrase “United States.”  In the context of punishment, the United States is the Justice 
Department, which prosecutes criminal antitrust violations.  In the context of providing 
remedy for private plaintiffs, the United States is the court system.)  Judge Kaplan also cited 
provisions in the legislative history of the FTAIA demonstrating the concern for the location 
of the particular plaintiffs’ injuries and the nexus between the effect and the injury.  129 F. 
Supp. 2d at 624-625 (quoting H.R. No. 97-686 7-12 (1982), reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487.  Judge Kaplan surely would not have taken long on remand to discover 
in that same legislative history the express intent to preserve the doctrines of antitrust 
standing and antitrust injury.  See H.R. 97-686, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2496 
(“Conduct which has an anticompetitive effect which impinges only on [plaintiffs] located 
in foreign nations and which has a neutral or procompetitive domestic effect” does not give 
rise to standing under the antitrust laws.). 
161 Kruman, 284 F.3d at 399-400. 
162 Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15. 
163 Empagran, 315 F.3d 338, 350-351 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (calling the structural argument 
“plausible but ultimately unconvincing”). 
164 See Empagran, 315 F.3d at 358 (fact of FTAIA being satisfied implies plaintiffs were 
appropriate plaintiffs to bring suit). 
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type of exporter plaintiff that must suffer harm to permit 
extraterritorial jurisdiction: “sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to 
such conduct only for injury to export business in the United 
States.”165 But that textual support, at most, is a limitation on 
standing applicable only to a narrow class of exporter plaintiffs.  It 
cannot support reading the FTAIA to address the antitrust standing 
inquiry more broadly.166 
Two strong arguments refute the D.C. Circuit’s hybrid approach 
to the FTAIA.  First, the FTAIA gives no indication, in its text or in 
its legislative history, of any intent to supplant the body of antitrust 
standing doctrine that has grown up around interpretations of Clayton 
Act section 4.167 To the contrary, the legislative history explicitly 
recognized the preservation of “existing concepts of antitrust injury 
or antitrust standing.”168 Second, the FTAIA applies equally in 
actions brought by the government.169 This is so although the 
antitrust enforcement agencies are not required to establish standing 
to bring suit over substantive antitrust violations.170 If satisfying the 
FTAIA precludes a standing analysis, the statutory inquiry resolves 
the standing question even for those government plaintiffs that need 
not establish standing.  The opposite side of the same coin is that the 
extraterritoriality analysis under the FTAIA is redundant to an 
analysis under Section 4, violating the principle that statutes should 
be construed to avoid redundancy.171 The better understanding is 
 
165 15 U.S.C. § 6a, 6a(1)(B). 
166 Under the expressio unius et exclusio alterius canon of construction, the explicit 
reference to exporter plaintiffs is evidence that the FTAIA does not address the standing 
inquiry for other plaintiffs. 
167 See deAtucha v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 510, 517 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985) (holding the FTAIA “not applicable to the instant action (because it relates to 
jurisdiction, not standing)”). 
168 H.R. Rep. No. 97-686 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2496. 
169 See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement 
Guidelines for Int’l Operations §§ 3.12, 3.121 (Apr. 1995) (“To the extent that conduct in 
foreign countries does not ‘involve’ import commerce but does have an ‘effect’ on either 
import transactions or commerce within the United States, the Agencies apply the ‘direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable’ standard of the FTAIA.”). 
170 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 4 (granting to the Department of Justice power to enforce 
substantive provisions of the Sherman Act).  See also Empagran, 542 U.S. at 170-171. 
171 See Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 256 (1992) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
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that the FTAIA speaks to conduct of concern, and Section 4 governs 
the right to sue. 
 
2.  The Supreme Court in Empagran Followed These Standing 
Decision Principles 
 
The likely explanation for the Court’s failure to discuss antitrust 
standing is that Justice Breyer chose to apply the rationale implicitly, 
couching his opinion as an interpretation of the FTAIA in light of 
principles of prescriptive comity.172 Three features of the Court’s 
opinion in Empagran justify reading it as a standing opinion, even if 
couched as a jurisdiction holding.  First is the Court’s reliance on 
California v. American Stores Co.173 to support the argument that 
cases involving the United States as a plaintiff do not inform the 
extraterritoriality analysis for private plaintiffs.  Second is the 
Court’s emphasis on doctrine, including comity considerations and 
the first-principles deterrence rationales, that are best suited to a 
malleable standing analysis.  Third is the Court’s failure to overrule 
its opinion in Hartford Fire. Empagran should be seen as evidence 
of what the Supreme Court will do when the standing issue is 
squarely presented in the extraterritoriality arena. 
 
172 This explanation finds support in the treatment of standing in briefing by the United 
States as amicus. The United States argued that the standing question was subsumed into 
the FTAIA.  See Brief of the United States and Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Petition for Reh’g En Banc, Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd.,
D.C. Cir. No. 01-7115, at 9, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200800/200866.pdf.   
 One implication of this interpretation is that Justice Scalia in concurrence, who dissented 
from the Court’s failure to recognize comity limitations on the extraterritorial reach of the 
antitrust laws in Hartford Fire, misunderstood the actual import of the majority’s Empagran 
opinion.  In light of the vigor of his dissent in Hartford Fire, it is unlikely that a decision in 
line with the Hartford Fire approach of treating comity as a prudential matter—what this 
article argues is placing the comity concern into the standing framework—would command 
a concurrence in any of its reasoning by Justice Scalia.  On the other hand, treating what is 
essentially a standing analysis as a matter of interpretation informed by notions of 
prescriptive comity might have been a political compromise to avoid fracturing as in 
Hartford Fire. 
173 495 U.S. 271 (1990). 
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a.  Public Versus Private Enforcement 
 
The distinction between public and private enforcement and the 
citation to American Stores makes sense in a standing analysis.  They 
do not make sense in the context of subject-matter jurisdiction.  As 
the American Stores Court noted, private plaintiffs “must have 
standing * * * in order to obtain relief.”174 But “[i]n a Government 
case the proof of the violation of law may itself establish sufficient 
public injury to warrant relief.”175 Empagran cited this authority to 
distinguish Timken Roller Bearing Co., National Lead Co., and 
American Tobacco Co.,176 which respondents had cited as examples 
of extraterritorial application of the U.S. antitrust scheme pre-
FTAIA.177 Because those cases were brought by the United States, 
not by private plaintiffs, they did not speak to the standards for 
extraterritoriality in private litigation. 
 The FTAIA makes no distinction between public and private 
plaintiffs.  It applies equally whether the suit is one by the 
government as a regulator or a private plaintiff seeking compensation 
for harm suffered as a market participant.  There also is no 
distinction between public enforcement and private enforcement in 
the substantive definition of an antitrust claim.  If a distinction 
between the two is relevant, it is because only the private plaintiff 
finds its right of action in Section 4 and must prove standing.  The 
Empagran Court’s invocation of that distinction, and of American 
Stores, is a reliance on the standing inquiry. 
 Also, the Court expressly noted the different incentives between 
private plaintiffs and government plaintiffs.178 This reflects an 
invocation of the optimization goals that this article has argued are 
 
174 American Stores, 495 U.S. at 296 (discussing standing in the context of the private 
injunctive remedy under Clayton Act § 16). 
175 Id. at 295. 
176 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. 
National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 
106 (1911). 
177 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 170. 
178 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 171 (citing Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritoriality in U.S. and EU 
Antitrust Enforcement, 67 Antitrust L.J. 159, 194 (1999)). 
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embedded in the prudential standing inquiry.179 The FTAIA, by 
contrast, does nothing to address the differential incentives. 
 
b.  Reliance on Previously Unused Rationales 
 
Reliance on comity concerns and deterrence rationale as decision 
principles makes more sense in a standing analysis.  One court 
recently has  
 
reject[ed] the notion that a comity analysis is part of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Comity considerations * * 
* are properly treated as questions of whether a court 
should, in its discretion, decline to exercise subject 
matter jurisdiction that it already possesses.  Our 
approach to each of these issues is in harmony with 
the analogous rules for extraterritorial application of 
the antitrust laws.180 
Comity and deterrence principles are not grounded anywhere in the 
text of the antitrust laws.  In particular, they are not found in the text 
of the FTAIA.  Instead, Congress explicitly left to the courts the 
question whether and how to invoke comity principles.  And the 
inverse deterrence argument did not exist in 1982; the amnesty 
program on which it is based has been in existence only since 
1993.181 
 The prudential standing inquiry is an inquiry in which the 
common law always has been employed to advance the doctrine.182 
It is thus an inquiry that permits courts to address principles not set 
 
179 See supra nn. 53-64 and accompanying text. 
180 McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Empagran, 542 U.S. 
155, and Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. 764). 
181 See Department of Justice, Corporate Leniency Policy, supra n. 67. 
182 See Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 533 (“Congress simply assumed that 
antitrust damages litigation would be subject to constraints comparable to well-accepted 
common-law rules applied in comparable litigation”); Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. at 
477 (comparing standing doctrine to common-law tort causation).  Cf. Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Is There a Rachet in Antitrust Law?, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 705, 706 (1982) (noting 
that the antitrust laws are interpreted in the nature of common law analysis). 
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down by Congress in statutory text.  The Court’s reliance on extra-
statutory principles is better understood as reliance on standing 
doctrine than subject-matter jurisdiction doctrine. 
 A contrary explanation might be that prescriptive comity 
principles speak to interpretations of the antitrust laws generally, 
including the FTAIA.  That is the most reasonable understanding of 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Empagran. Of course, that says 
nothing about the emphasis on deterrence concerns, which only can 
be justified by looking outside the text of the FTAIA.  Also, 
prescriptive comity doctrine is not a tool for parsing statutory 
language.  It speaks generally to the need to avoid offending foreign 
sovereign authority.  A principled approach to interpretation could 
respect prescriptive comity doctrine while placing the comity concern 
in the only appropriate box in the statutory scheme.  That box is 
Section 4, not the FTAIA. 
 
c.  Reconciling Hartford Fire 
 
The Court’s failure to overrule Hartford Fire, even while adopting 
a broader definition of the comity consideration, is further evidence 
that the Court relied in fact on a prudential standing inquiry.  
Hartford Fire defined the comity consideration narrowly as a 
subject-matter jurisdiction question.183 It rejected the importation by 
the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 
N.T. & S.A.,184 of comity questions as part of the effects test.185 After 
Hartford Fire, commentators and courts generally understood comity 
 
183 As the First Circuit recently has noted, “[t]he Hartford Fire Court also held that comity 
considerations, such as whether relief ordered by an American court would conflict with 
foreign law, were properly understood not as questions of whether a United States court 
possessed subject matter jurisdiction, but instead as issues of whether such a court should 
decline to exercise jurisdiction that it already possessed.”  McBee v. Delica Corp., 417 F.3d 
107, 120 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 797-798 & n.24); id. at 121 
(“comity considerations are properly analyzed not as questions of whether there is subject 
matter jurisdiction, but as prudential questions of whether that jurisdiction should be 
exercised”). 
184 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
185 See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798 (“international comity would not counsel against 
exercising jurisdiction in the circumstances alleged here”). 
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concerns to preclude a finding of subject-matter jurisdiction only 
where a direct conflict existed between the foreign sovereign’s laws 
and the laws of the United States. 
 The Empagran Court effected an about-face on the comity 
rationale.  For example, Empagran approved the comity analysis 
from Timberlane.186 The about-face can be justified by reference to 
standing principles, which explanation also reconciles Empagran 
with Hartford Fire. Hartford Fire stated a narrow comity analysis 
for subject-matter jurisdiction purposes, explicitly leaving for another 
day the prudential question.187 Empagran broadened the comity 
principle as a prudential matter. 
 
III. PRUDENTIAL STANDING ANALYSIS DEFINES THE EMPAGRAN 
EXCEPTION 
Since the Supreme Court’s opinion in Empagran, courts have 
treated the Empagran exception as a question of the degree of nexus 
between the effect on domestic U.S. commerce alleged and the harm 
suffered by the plaintiff in foreign commerce.  The simple proximate 
cause analysis, though, is notoriously slippery.188 Lacking a clear 
statement of decision principles, the Empagran exception has 
produced as much confusion as existed prior to Empagran.189 The 
correct approach is to treat proximacy of the causal nexus between 
domestic U.S. effects and foreign harm as one part of an updated 
antitrust standing inquiry.190 
 
186 See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 173 (describing Timberlane as “a leading contemporaneous 
lower-court case”). 
187 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799 (“We have no need in this litigation to address other 
considerations that might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction on 
grounds of international comity.”). 
188 See Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. at 477 (noting the indefiniteness of the 
proximate cause inquiry). E.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928) 
(Cardozo, C.J.); id. at 101 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
189 See 2 Waller, Antitrust & Am. Bus. Abroad, supra, § 13.23 (noting that questions 
remain open after Empagran and the exception is being tested in a wave of new litigation). 
190 Cf. Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 532, 540 (considering proximate cause 
as an element of the standing inquiry). 
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A.  The Indeterminate Proximate Cause Analysis 
 
On remand in Empagran II, the D.C. Circuit defined the 
Empagran exception as a proximate cause analysis.191 It noted the 
language of the FTAIA required that an effect on U.S. commerce 
“give rise to” a claim.  That language “indicates a direct causal 
relationship, that is, proximate causation, and is not satisfied by the 
mere but-for ‘nexus’ the appellants advanced.”192 Initially, why 
“gives rise to” equates to proximate cause is not clear.  The D.C. 
Circuit cited no authority for that proposition, which the plaintiffs 
had conceded.193 
The Empagran II court’s proximate cause analysis would be 
difficult to replicate reliably.  Under that standard, the D.C. Circuit 
concluded plaintiffs’ world-wide conspiracy argument, supported by 
the arbitrage concern, “demonstrates at most but-for causation.”194 
The causal connection was not proximate apparently because two 
sets of fixed prices were involved—the fixed prices in domestic U.S. 
commerce that facilitated price-fixing in foreign commerce, and the 
 
191 417 F.3d 1267, 1270-1271 (“The statutory language—“gives rise to”—indicates a direct 
causal relationship, that is, proximate causation, and is not satisfied by the mere but-for 
‘nexus’ the appellants advanced in their brief.”) 
 In OSRecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe Int’l, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), the 
district court considered a complaint seeking to apply the RICO statute extraterritorially.  
Despite the absence from the RICO scheme of a statute like the FTAIA, the court relied on 
the effects test from the antitrust scheme to hold that the U.S. effect of conduct must 
“directly cause[]” a foreign plaintiff’s loss for the law to apply extraterritorially.  Id. at 367.  
The private right of action provision in the RICO statute often has been interpreted in 
keeping with the interpretation of Clayton Act section 4.  See Holmes v. SIPC, __. 
192 Id. at 1271. 
193 Empagran II, 417 F.3d at 1270-1271 (“the statutory language—‘gives rise to’—
indicates a direct causal relationship, that is, proximate causation”); id. at 1270 (plaintiffs’ 
concession).  In fact, the FTAIA contains a textual clue that “gives rise to” does not imply 
the kind of directness requirement the D.C. Circuit, since followed by a handful of district 
courts, saw fit to impose.  The first element of the FTAIA analysis requires a demonstration 
that conduct have a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic 
commerce, import commerce, or certain types of export commerce.  15 U.S.C. § 6a(1).  See 
supra nn. 72-87 and accompanying text (analysis of the FTAIA).  But the second element 
requires only that the effect “gives rise to a claim” under the antitrust laws.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 6a(2).  The statute lacks any requirement of a direct relationship between the effect and 
the plaintiff’s claim. 
194 Empagran II, 417 F.3d at 1271. 
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fixed prices in foreign commerce that actually caused the plaintiffs’ 
injury.195 However, whether the Empagran plaintiffs were harmed 
by downstream effects of price fixing in domestic U.S. commerce or 
by a unitary worldwide price-fixing scheme that also injured U.S. 
plaintiffs is little more than a semantic question.  It is not clear what 
about the worldwide price-fixing scheme alleged leads to an indirect 
and merely but-for, rather than a direct and proximate, causal nexus 
in Empagran.196 A second problem with the Empagran II court’s 
analysis is that it fails to heed the comity and deterrence principles 
that underlie the Supreme Court’s Empagran opinion. 
 Other courts following the D.C. Circuit’s lead have engaged in 
similarly indeterminate analyses of proximate versus but-for 
causation.  A magistrate judge in the Southern District of New York, 
in Latino Quimica-Amtex S.A. v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals B.V., held 
that plaintiffs’ claims did not meet the Empagran exception.197 In 
that case, plaintiffs’ counsel conceded the application of the D.C. 
Circuit’s proximate causation rule.198 Interestingly, the court—citing 
Associated General Contractors and Blue Shield v. McCready—
grounded the proximate cause standard in “antitrust principles 
requiring that an antitrust injury-in-fact be caused directly by a 
defendant’s conduct,”199 not in an analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Empagran.
195 Ibid. 
196 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.  Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd.,
126 S. Ct. 1043 (2006). 
197 2005-2 Trade Cas. ¶ 74, 974, 2005 WL 2207017 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2005).  Plaintiffs 
had alleged that “‘unlawful price fixing and market allocation conduct had adverse effects in 
the United States and in other nations that caused injury to Plaintiffs in connection with 
their foreign MCAA purchases.’”  Latino-Quimica-Amtex S.A., 2005-2 Trade Cas. ¶ 74, 
974, 2005 WL 2207017, at *9.  Other allegations stated that “‘Defendants[’] and their co-
conspirators’ illegal contract, combination and conspiracy to harm U.S. and world 
commerce directly injured Plaintiffs.’”  Ibid. (quoting the complaint).  See also In re 
Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litigation, 2006-1 Trade Cas. ¶ 75, 
163, 2006 WL 515629, at *4-*5 (N.D. Cal. March 1, 2006) (holding that allegations of a 
worldwide conspiracy “[w]ithout more * * * constitute no more than the ‘but-for’ causation 
that the Empagran cases find objectionable”). 
198 Id. at *8. 
199 Ibid. (citing Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982), and 
Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 532-524 (1983)). 
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Although the Latino Quimica-Amtex complaint lacked allegations 
of an arbitrage capability, the court also denied plaintiffs leave to 
amend their complaint to include allegations, supported by an 
economic expert, of a worldwide ripple effect of price-fixing in U.S. 
commerce.200 The magistrate judge held plaintiffs’ alleged “causal 
link * * * [was] simply too indirect to support” a finding of subject 
matter jurisdiction.201 
Another case dismissing for failure to meet the Empagran 
exception shows how difficult—perhaps impossible—it will be for 
foreign plaintiffs to meet the proximate cause standard once a court 
has determined to apply it.  In eMag Solutions LLC v. Toda Kogyo 
Corp., the court dismissed claims also relying on arbitrage 
allegations.202 “They contend that if defendants’ conspiracy had not 
inflated U.S. prices, the foreign plaintiffs would not have been 
injured because lower American prices would have driven down 
international prices overall, including through arbitrage * * *.”203 
The plaintiffs in eMag Solutions specifically alleged they were 
prepared to engage in arbitrage to end-run fixed prices, but fixed 
prices in domestic U.S. commerce prevented their doing so.204 The 
district court nonetheless held the foreign plaintiffs had not alleged a 
proximate causal connection.  It is difficult to imagine what more the 
eMag Solutions plaintiffs could have done to allege proximate cause.  
 
200 Id. at *13. 
201 Id. at *12-*13 (citing Empagran, 417 F.3d 107; MM Global Services, 329 F. Supp. 2d 
337; and In re Monosodium Glutemate Antitrust Litigation, 2005-1 Trade Cas. ¶ 74, 781).     
 The Latino Quimica-Amtex court held that “nothing in these allegations even suggests that 
Plaintiffs’ injuries were directly, or proximately, caused by the domestic effect of 
Defendants’ alleged conspiracy.”  Ibid. The dismissal in Latino Quimica-Amtex currently is 
on appeal to the Second Circuit. 
202 eMag Sol’ns LLC v. Toda Kogyo Corp., 2005 WL 1712084, at *4, *5 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
203 Id. at *6. 
204 Plaintiffs “‘would have been particularly well-suited to replace purchases * * * in purely 
foreign commerce with purchases * * * in American commerce, if the conspiracy had not 
affected the prices * * * in American commerce.”  Id. at *4 (quoting the third-amended 
complaint). 
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eMag Solutions may be a demonstration that the Empagran 
exception, if defined by proximate cause, is illusory.205 
By contrast with these decisions, a district court in Connecticut in 
MM Global Services, Inc. v. The Dow Chemical Co.206 held that 
allegations raising the same arbitrage concern as the worldwide 
conspiracy allegations in Empagran were sufficient to meet the 
Empagran exception.207 Plaintiffs alleged the defendants sought to 
“ensure that prices charged by the plaintiffs to end-users in India for 
products would not cause erosion to prices” in the United States.208 
There is no apparent distinction between the allegations in MM 
Global and the allegations held elsewhere not to meet the Empagran 
exception.209 
A district court in Minnesota, in In re Monosodium Glutamate 
Antitrust Litigation (MSG),210 initially interpreted the Empagran 
exception consistently with the District of Connecticut in MM 
Global. Foreign plaintiffs’ allegations of a worldwide conspiracy to 
fix the prices of fungible, globally marketed products survived a 
 
205 eMag lends support to Professor Cavanagh’s conclusion that the Supreme Court in 
Empagran left the D.C. Circuit on remand no choice but to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims.  
See Cavanagh, 58 S.M.U. L. Rev., supra, at 1437. 
206 329 F. Supp. 2d 337 (D. Conn. 2004). 
207 Id. at 342. 
208 Id. at 340 (quoting the amended complaint). 
209 The only identifiable difference between the allegations in MM Global and the 
reasoning in Empagran is that the MM Global plaintiffs alleged that “‘[a]s a direct and 
proximate result’” of the defendant’s conduct, harm was felt.  Id. at 342 (quoting the 
complaint).  An allegation that something was the proximate cause is an allegation of a legal 
conclusion, not of fact.  See Latino Quimica-Amtex, 2005 WL 2207017, at *13 (“[w]ithout 
the factual predicate to support these allegations, however, they cannot be read to plead the 
requisite causal link between the conspiracy’s domestic effect and Plaintiffs’ foreign 
claim”).  But the proximate cause allegations in MM Global did not relate to a connection 
between an effect on U.S. commerce and harm in India, as most courts’ understanding of 
the Empagran exception requires.  The complaint alleged merely the harm felt in India was 
“‘the result of such effect on competition’” in the United States.  MM Global Services, 329 
F. Supp. 2d at 342 (quoting the complaint). But see eMag Solutions, 2005 WL 1712084, at 
*7 (“the district court in MM Global never discussed whether ‘but-for’ causation is the 
appropriate standard” and noting that “the case did not concern “purely foreign 
commerce”). 
210 2005-2 Trade Cas. ¶ 75,022, 2005 WL 2810681 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2005). 
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motion to dismiss.211 But demonstrating the confusion that reigns 
since Empagran, the MSG court reconsidered its holding.212 It was 
“persuaded by the decision and reasoning of the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals” in Empagran II.213 The MSG court held 
on reconsideration a worldwide conspiracy allegation established at 
best but-for, not proximate, cause, and that Empagran required the 
latter.214 
 
B.  Applying Standing Doctrine to Define the Empagran Exception 
 
A workable definition of the scope of the Empagran exception is 
reached by treating it as a question of the antitrust standing doctrine, 
modified to encompass the considerations recognized in Empagran.
To be sure, the Empagran Court noted the difficulty of case-by-case 
analysis when it stated a bright-line rule governing suits by plaintiffs 
injured in wholly foreign commerce.215 But the bright-line rule, and 
the admonition that case-by-case analysis was impractical, applied to 
the Court’s narrow holding interpreting the FTAIA.  The Court 
expressly did not purport to define how lower courts should apply the 
Empagran exception. 
 What is important about the Empagran exception is just that—it is 
an exception to the limitation on extraterritorial reach imposed by the 
FTAIA.  Undefined, the exception could be limitless—courts in 
theory could consider any claim of a nexus to an effect in U.S. 
commerce to be sufficient,216 or it could be meaningless—courts in 
theory could require a nexus to a domestic effect so strong that no 
 
211 Id. at *1-*2 (citing In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 2005-1 Trade Cas. 
¶ 74,781, 2005 WL 1080790 (D. Minn. May 2, 2005)). 
212 In re MSG, 2005-2 Trade Cas. ¶ 75, 022, 2005 WL 2810681 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2005). 
213 Id. at *3. 
214 Ibid. MSG  has been appealed to the Eighth Circuit.  See Notice of Appeal, In re 
Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litigation, 00-MDL-1328 (D. Minn.) (filed Nov. 23, 
2005). 
215 See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 168.  See also Cavanagh, 58 S.M.U. L. Rev. at 1436 
(calling the approach “unwise as a policy matter”). 
216 The holding of the District of Connecticut in MM Global, accepting a mere allegation 
that foreign harm was “the result of” an effect in U.S. commerce, might be thought to be an 
example of a nearly unlimited definition of the Empagran exception. 
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wholly foreign harm would qualify.217 All that Empagran made clear 
is that the narrow bright-line rule it espoused did not define the 
exception.218 But the decision principles that led the Court to an 
understanding of the FTAIA also should assist a principled 
understanding of the Empagran exception.  Those principles best are 
accommodated in a prudential standing analysis.219 
 
1.  Reasons for Relying on a Prudential Standing Analysis 
 
Prudential standing doctrine has strong arguments to recommend 
it.  A primary accolade is that the doctrine is the most consistent with 
the structure of the U.S. antitrust regime.220 Although the subject 
matter jurisdiction question under the FTAIA remains essential to 
determining what conduct is cognizable in a U.S. antitrust court, the 
standing inquiry tells a court which plaintiff can complain about that 
conduct.221 Another is that the standing inquiry is malleable and 
subject to common-law development.  It is thus an appropriate, and 
 
217 See, e.g., eMag Solutions, 329 F. Supp. 2d 337. 
218 See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 175. 
219 Case-by-case analysis of a range of factors is the hallmark of the Associated General 
Contractors analysis.  See Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 531-533 (antitrust 
standing is a common-law analysis).   See also Gregory Marketing Corp. v. Wakefern Food 
Corp., 787 F.2d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1986) (“In both situations the infinite variety of claims that 
may arise make it virtually impossible to announce a black-letter rule that will govern in 
every case. Instead, previously decided cases identify factors that circumscribe and guide 
the exercise of judgment in deciding whether the law affords a remedy in specific 
circumstances.”); Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 552 F.2d 90, 99 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(“§ 4 standing analysis is essentially a balancing test comprised of many constant and 
variable factors and that there is no talismanic test capable of resolving all § 4 standing 
problems”); deAtucha v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 510, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985) (interpreting the Court’s standing authorities as requiring case-by-case analysis of the 
Associated General Contractors factors). 
220 Related to this structural argument is the fact that whether extraterritoriality is treated as 
a standing or as a subject-matter jurisdiction analysis, a private plaintiff necessarily must 
satisfy the standing inquiry to establish its right to sue under Clayton Act § 4.  If courts first 
conduct a proximate cause inquiry to determine the reach of their subject-matter jurisdiction 
under the FTAIA, that same inquiry will be part of the standing analysis that will follow.  
See, e.g., Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap v. HeereMac VOF, 241 F.3d 420, 431 n.32 (5th Cir. 
2001) (noting that because the FTAIA analysis was not met, the standing analysis 
necessarily would fail).  Respecting the structure of the antitrust laws limits that 
redundancy. 
221 See supra n. 26, nn. 30-50 and accompanying text. 
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the only appropriate, repository of new concerns such as the comity 
and inverse deterrence concerns that came to the fore in 
Empagran.222 Those rationales cannot be fit neatly into the 
proximate cause inquiry followed by courts after Empagran.223 They 
also have no textual basis in any of the antitrust statutes. 
 Vis-a-vis subject matter jurisdiction, antitrust standing doctrine 
has all of the procedural advantages of permitting early dismissal of 
suits.224 It adds to those benefits the substantial procedural benefit of 
waivability (which subject-matter jurisdiction lacks).225 Early 
dismissal is especially important in the realm of extraterritorial 
antitrust enforcement because of both comity concerns and over-
deterrence concerns.  First, comity concerns regularly are recognized 
to exist not just in the case of U.S. courts imposing actual liability in 
situations in which foreign sovereigns have regulatory interests, but 
also in the case of actors being required to submit to U.S. regulatory 
procedures, including judicial proceedings, where foreign sovereign 
regulation is implicated.226 Second, over-deterrence concerns 
increase the further in litigation suit is permitted to proceed before 
the resolution of a dispositive motion.  The very expense of 
defending against massive antitrust litigation usually causes 
defendants to seek settlement regardless of the merits of the claims 
and sometimes with little regard to the likelihood of the plaintiffs’ 
success in trial.227 
222 See McBee v. Delica Corp., 417 F.3d 407, __ (1st Cir. 2005). 
223 Tellingly, neither Empagran II, nor any of the other courts analyzing the 
Empagran exception as a proximate cause inquiry, have even tried to analyze the comity 
and inverse deterrence rationales when considering the scope of the exception. 
224 See Verizon Corp. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, __ (2004) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that a court should begin by analyzing standing); Hairston 
v. Pac-10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1320-1321 (9th Cir. 1996) (Trott, J., concurring) 
(noting that standing analysis is a preliminary inquiry). 
225 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (Rule 12(b)(1) arguments of a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 
can be raised at any time in litigation). 
226 Cf. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1608.  A common example of bare judicial proceedings alone 
giving rise to comity concerns is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) context.  
Courts repeatedly have held that immunity under the FSIA is immunity from suit, not just 
from liability.  Although the analyses under the FSIA and FTAIA are not related, as a matter 
of the first principles comity question the FSIA analysis is instructive. 
227 See Frank Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 635 (1989); Paul J. 
Stancil, Atomism and the Private Merger Challenge, 78 Temple L. Rev. 949 (2005). 
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Waivability helps to realize the goal of optimization.  Waiver of a 
ground for dismissal is a recognition that the benefits to the 
defendant and to the court system of dismissal decrease the longer a 
defendant in litigation waits to seek it.228   The waiver doctrine also 
recognizes that at some point, the investment in litigation by the 
plaintiffs and by the court system has reached a level that warrants 
respect.  When the harm to the plaintiff from dismissing the case on 
procedural grounds exceeds the benefit to the defendant from its 
dismissal, it makes sense to refuse dismissal on grounds of waiver.   
 
2.  Updating Antitrust Standing With Considerations from Empagran 
 
The prudential standing inquiry developed under interpretations of 
Section 4 does not appropriately capture the costs and benefits of 
private extraterritorial enforcement, which now are understood to 
include (1) international comity ramifications of extraterritorial 
enforcement,229 and (2) harm to the public enforcement regime under 
the inverse deterrence rationale.  These must be included in a modern 
analysis of which plaintiff is best situated to sue.230 Doing so will 
 
228 For example, if the comity or over-deterrence concern implicates the very fact of a 
defendant’s being required to submit to discovery, once discovery has been completed or 
substantially completed, that harm has been fully wrought.  The benefit of dismissal no 
longer includes the benefits of avoiding expensive and burdensome discovery and of 
avoiding being required unfairly to submit to the U.S. antitrust regulatory scheme. 
229 One example of the greater importance of foreign sovereign interests in the modern era 
is the increased attention given by foreign governments to decisions by the U.S. Supreme 
Court and the increased involvement as amici curiae in Supreme Court litigation.  In 1983, 
___ briefs were filed by foreign government amici in the Supreme Court, and no foreign 
government amici were permitted to present oral argument.  In 2005, ___ foreign 
government briefs were filed, and the government of the Bahamas was permitted to argue in 
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Lines. Rigorous empirical analysis of this issue is appropriate 
to determine the actual impact of foreign governmental interest on the decision analyses of 
U.S. courts. 
230 The ability of standing analysis to accommodate changing realities is one of its great 
strengths.  See, e.g., McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, __ (1st Cir. 2005) (relying on 
antitrust extraterritoriality decisions because they reflect consideration of circumstances not 
considered in earlier Lanham Act decisions). 
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enable tailoring of antitrust remedies to serve the essential deterrence 
and compensation goals of antitrust.231 
 
a.  New Emphasis on Comity Concerns 
The Empagran Court admonished that litigation must not go 
forward if foreign comity concerns militated sufficiently strongly 
against it.232 The rule following Empagran is that some safeguard 
must be in place.  As in the domestic enforcement sphere, with 
regard to extraterritorial enforcement, courts cannot rely on private 
plaintiffs to self-select and not bring suit because of diplomatic 
concerns.233 A modified prudential standing analysis permits courts 
to decline to hear cases that, based on their developed common-law 
experience, should not be cognizable.  This flexible analysis of 
comity concerns can take account of changing circumstances 
horizontally—with regard to which foreign sovereign is in question, 
and vertically—over time. 
 The Empagran litigation is a prime example of the benefits of 
malleability in the invocation of foreign comity concerns.  Consider 
first horizontal variation.  At issue in Empagran were foreign 
sovereigns with which the United States has diplomatic ties.  The 
comity analysis for other foreign sovereigns might differ.  
 The degree to which comity concerns are implicated by 
extraterritorial enforcement also depends on the nature of that 
sovereign’s economic regulation.  Empagran raised comity concerns 
with regard to four foreign sovereigns—Australia, Ecuador, Panama 
and the Ukraine—whose antitrust regulation, or lack of regulation, 
was threatened with preemption if the foreign plaintiffs’ claims were 
permitted to go forward in U.S. court under U.S. law.234 Scholars 
analyzing Empagran have ignored the fact that those countries did 
not appear in the litigation raising comity concerns.  The concerns 
 
231 Cf. William H. Page, 37 Stan. L. Rev., supra, at 1450-1452 (arguing that standing 
optimizes remedies in the domestic enforcement context). 
232 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 173-175. 
233 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (noting private plaintiffs’ incentives to 
sue in U.S. courts). 
234 See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 159. 
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came, instead, from others such as Britian, Canada, Germany, and 
Japan—major U.S. trading partners with robust antitrust 
regulation.235 The U.S. government, the parties, and other amici also 
advanced comity arguments, primarily in the contexts of U.S. allies 
with sophisticated antitrust laws.236 Neither scholarly nor judicial 
analysis has considered the extent to which the comity concerns that 
were advanced were relevant to the particular sovereign nations 
whose antitrust regulation—or lack thereof, in the case of 
Ecuador237— supposedly were threatened with being undermined. 
 In Hartford Fire, the Court observed that some types of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of U.S. economic regulation do not 
undermine foreign sovereigns’ efforts to regulate their own domestic 
commerce.238 The Court asked only whether U.S. regulation actually 
conflicted with regulation by foreign sovereigns.  Because it did not, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction was found.239 There may be a good 
explanation why foreign amici in Empagran were limited to those 
nations with sophisticated antitrust regulation.  Sovereign nations 
without such regulation may be ill-inclined to oppose assistance by 
U.S. courts in maintaining competitive conditions in their own 
domestic commerce.  At a minimum, a court should explore this 
question in an individual case before assuming the 
Empagran approach applies to a particular foreign sovereign.240 
235 See supra n. 12 and accompanying text (describing amicus involvement of Canada, 
Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, the Netherlands and Japan). 
236 But see Cert.-Stage Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus 
Curiae, F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., No. 03-724, at 15-17 (making 
arguments in the specific context of Australia). 
237 Ecuador does not have an antitrust enforcement regime.  See Bruce M. Owen, 
Competition Policy in Latin America, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics 
Working Paper 268, at 63 (2003) (table listing Latin American competition policies and 
enforcement agencies). 
238 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798-799. 
239 Id. at 799. 
240 Apart from Australia, which has taken active efforts to oppose U.S. antitrust courts’ 
extraterritorial jurisdiction (see, e.g., 1 Spencer W. Waller, Antitrust & Am. Business 
Abroad § 4.17 (3d ed. 1997) (noting Austrialia’s “blocking statute”)), the foreign sovereigns 
at issue in Empagran have not demonstrated an aversion to extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
Ecuador does not have an antitrust scheme at all.  See supra n. 239. 
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The temporal “vertical” analysis of comity considerations is not 
constant either.  For any one foreign sovereign, U.S. diplomatic 
policy toward that country is not unchanging.  Legal rules developed 
based on the comity analysis on day zero might not be relevant on 
day one.241 The same applies with regard to changing economic 
regulations worldwide.  The advent of antitrust regulations in foreign 
countries in recent decades has been a much remarked 
phenomenon.242 Justification for extraterritorial application of U.S. 
antitrust laws will decrease as that development continues and other 
sovereigns’  regulations become more sophisticated.  Conversely, 
should there be a slowing or setback in that development, the need 
for extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws might increase.  
Few analyses demand the flexibility of common law analysis so 
much as does the comity question. 
 
b.  New Understanding of the Inverse Deterrence Rationale 
 
The inverse deterrence rationale had not been part of the 
extraterritoriality analysis before Empagran. In Empagran, not only 
was the U.S. Department of Justice’s leniency policy discussed, 
foreign governments as amici advanced their own amnesty policies 
 
241 A sufficient example of such temporal change is Iran.  Iran was a plaintiff in Pfizer 
Corp. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978), and was held in 1978 to be a “person” 
permitted to sue under the antitrust laws.  See id. at 309, 318.  Today, Iran is a part of what 
the Bush administration has declared the “axis of evil” and is a designated state sponsor of 
terror.  See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (2002) (“States like 
[Iran, Iraq and North Korea] * * * constitute an axis of evil * * *.”), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (visited Aug. 3, 
2006).  For Iran’s status as a state sponsor of terrorism, see State Sponsors of Terrorism 
(Table), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (visited Aug. 3, 2006).  The 
Court in Pfizer noted that it remains “within the exclusive power of the Executive Branch to 
determine which nations are entitled to sue.”  434 U.S. at 320; see also id. at 310 n.1 
(referencing nations, including Vietnam, whose suits were not permitted because the 
governments were not recognized by the U.S. government). 
242 See William E. Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Policy Reform in Transition 
Economies for U.S. Antitrust Policy, 74 St. John’s L. Rev. 361, 361-363 (2000); Makan 
Delrahim, Remarks, supra, at 2 (“there are nearly 100 jurisdictions with antitrust laws of 
one sort or another, from Albania to Zambia”). 
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as giving rise to inverse deterrence concerns.243 The Supreme Court 
gave substantial deference to these arguments. 
 Like the comity concerns discussed above, the inverse deterrence 
rationale is not static. Analysis of the inverse deterrence concern 
depends on, at a minimum, changing Executive Branch enforcement 
policy.  The Department of Justice’s amnesty program is a matter of 
prosecutorial discretion, not statute or even administrative regulation.  
It can be altered—limited or expanded—through mere executive 
fiat.244 It did not exist in 1982 when the FTAIA was enacted. 
 Other external effects of the rationale are the prevalence, or lack 
thereof, of major cartel behavior.  Cartelization has not been a 
consistent phenomenon historically.245 Notably, scholarship 
demonstrates that 1982 was during a nearly half-century lull in the 
prevalence of multinational cartels.246 The specific issues of 
worldwide interdependence that the Empagran litigation has raised 
were not well understood at the time the FTAIA was enacted. 
 
c.  Seeking Optimization of Remedies 
 
In the modern framework, the optimization goals are best 
accomplished through a standing rationale extended into the 
extraterritorial enforcement sphere.  The modified prudential 
standing analysis will permit antitrust courts efficiently to implement 
the policies recognized in Empagran in a manner to avoid over-
deterrence and under-deterrence (comprised in part of inverse 
deterrence) concerns. 
 
243 See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 168; Brief of the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus 
Curiae, F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., S. Ct. No. 03-724, at 28.  Foreign 
sovereigns increasingly are using leniency or amnesty programs as part of a “carrot and 
stick” approach to anti-cartel enforcement.  See Deputy Assistant Attorney General Scott D. 
Hammond, Charting New Waters in International Cartel Prosecutions, 20th Annual Nat’l 
Inst. on White-Collar Crime 2 (March 2, 2006) (Charting New Waters), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/214861.pdf.  
244 Cf. Max Huffman, Book Review, Broken Trusts . . . 
245 Connor, Private International Cartels, supra, at 1-2 (describing ebbs and flows in cartel 
activity). 
246 Id. at 1 (describing the “inter-war period”). 
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Over-deterrence concerns also arise in the context of private 
extraterritorial enforcement. Concern for liability far disproportionate 
to the effect of conduct on U.S. commerce—like the concerns 
discussed above for false positives in substantive causes of action—
risks deterring potential antitrust defendants from engaging in 
conduct that is economically beneficial domestically.   
 The concern for over-deterrence due to excessive liability has 
three manifestations in the context of extraterritoriality.  One is an 
extension of the notion of a false positive.  The concerns for false 
positives become more compelling when the liability that may be 
imposed is based on claims by a world-wide plaintiff class. 
 A related concern is that of overlapping regulation.  A defendant 
subject to treble damages liability in a U.S. antitrust court for foreign 
harm might also be subject to liability in the courts of a foreign 
sovereign for that same harm.247 This especially might occur if 
overreaching by U.S. plaintiffs and courts encourages retaliatory 
exercises in extraterritorial regulation by foreign sovereigns. 
 The third manifestation of the over-deterrence concern in the 
extraterritoriality context is that conduct that harms competition in a 
foreign market might be beneficial, or neutral, to competition in 
domestic commerce.  Permitting suit by a plaintiff injured in foreign 
commerce does nothing to remedy harm suffered in U.S. commerce, 
but it chills conduct that is desirable in U.S. commerce. An example 
of this third manifestation of over-deterrence would be a course of 
price-fixing conduct in a foreign market used to fund pro-consumer 
price-cutting in U.S. commerce.  In Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,248 plaintiffs argued that price fixing by 
defendants in the Japanese market was used to fund below-cost 
pricing in U.S. markets.  Under that scheme, regulators and 
 
247 See Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Introduction: The Intractable Problem of 
Antitrust Jurisdiction, in Competition Laws in Conflict: Antitrust Jurisdiction in the Global 
Economy 1, 22 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, eds. 2004) (noting concerns for an 
“n-front war in countless and often hostile jurisdictions”); Wolfgang Kerber & Oliver 
Budzinski, Competition of Competition Laws: Mission Impossible?, in Competition Laws in 
Conflict, supra, at 31, 45 (“the [effects] doctrine has the potential to generate jurisdictional 
conflicts among the many countries where a given merger or cartel practice may have an 
effect”).  
248 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
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consumers in Japan might be concerned about the alleged price-
fixing conduct in that location, but U.S. consumers gained from the 
alleged antitrust violations.  Courts in the United States should not be 
concerned about harm overseas that is pro-competitive 
domestically.249 
In the specific context of export commerce, the FTAIA expressly 
implements the policy of avoiding over-deterrence.  Under section 
6a(1)(B), an “effect” that can give rise to antitrust liability in export 
commerce must be an effect on the business of U.S. exporters.250 An 
effect on export commerce that harms foreign purchasers is explicitly 
excluded.251 
The opposite concern, and one that motivates plaintiff-friendly 
decisions in the extraterritoriality analysis, is that of under-
deterrence.252 The under-deterrence concern has two 
manifestations—the traditional concern for liability that is 
insufficient to deter harmful conduct, and the recently-recognized 
inverse deterrence concern. 
 The traditional manifestation, which the Supreme Court 
recognized in Pfizer Corp. v. Government of India,253 is that 
regulatory gaps decrease the downside risk of liability for global 
cartels.254 The degree to which this concern is appropriate in the 
modern day is subject to debate.  A much remarked phenomenon 
 
249 Cf. Easterbrook, Rachet, supra, 60 Tex. L. Rev. at 708-709 (arguing that predation is 
not a concern unless the predator can recoup its losses incurred in predation. 
250 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(B) (“conduct has a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable 
effect * * * on export commerce with foreign nations of a person engaged in export 
commerce in the United States”).  See 1 Waller, Antitrust and Am. Bus. Abroad, supra, § __ 
(describing the FTAIA’s coverage of exporters). 
251 One might argue under the expressio unius canon this narrow concern for U.S. exporters 
proves a broader concern for foreign harm outside the context of export commerce.  
However, no such argument has been made or accepted. 
252 See Pfizer Corp. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 315 (1978).  Cf. McBee v. Delica Co.,
417 F.3d 107, 119 (1st Cir. 2005) (“In both the antitrust and the Lanham Act areas, there is 
a risk that absent a certain degree of extraterritorial enforcement, violators will either take 
advantage of international coordination problems or hide in countries without efficacious 
antitrust or trademark laws, thereby avoiding legal authority.”). 
253 434 U.S. 308 (1978). 
254 See Pfizer Corp., 434 U.S. at 315.  See also Connor,  Buxbaum, 5 German L. Rev., 
supra, at 1096-1097 (noting arguments that “aggregate global sanctions against hard-core 
cartels are insufficient to deter price-fixing”). 
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since Pfizer Corp. was decided in 1978 is the development of 
antitrust agencies worldwide,255 and a recent paper by an antitrust 
division official notes that “[a]ntitrust authorities throughout the 
world have become increasingly aggressive in investigating and 
sanctioning cartels.”256 The result of that change may be that 
material regulatory gaps are limited.257 Also, strong questions exist 
whether a U.S. antitrust court should be concerned if the remedy 
under U.S. law fails sufficiently to deter anticompetitive conduct in 
wholly foreign commerce.  So long as the deterrence and 
compensation functions are served in domestic commerce, that a 
cartel realizes profits in the aggregate is a problem for foreign 
sovereigns.  It is even possible that such a laissez-faire attitude 
toward unregulated foreign markets will result in sophisticated 
cartels directing their conduct only at the regulatory gaps—perhaps 
even, as alleged in Matshushita, with the effect of funding vigorous 
competition in U.S. markets. 
 The second under-deterrence manifestation is the particular 
concern recognized in Empagran. A negative externality of broad 
private enforcement is, paradoxically, decreased future cartel 
enforcement.  The massive civil liability to private plaintiffs risks 
overbearing the benefits available to a would-be informant from the 
Department of Justice’s amnesty program.  They are unlikely to 
disclose participation, which has the effect of cementing cartels.258 
Like the over-deterrence concerns addressed above, the inverse 
 
255 See William E. Kovacic, 74 St. John’s L. Rev., supra, at 361-363; Delrahim, Remarks,
supra, at 2.  Although some have argued “anti-cartel enforcement is too difficult for 
agencies that are relatively new to antitrust enforcement,” others maintain that view is 
inaccurate, and that anti-cartel enforcement should be the primary focus of new regulatory 
regimes.  Barnett, Presentation, supra, at 4.  See also id. at 4-5 (arguing for international 
coordinated efforts in criminal enforcement); Epstein & Greve, in Competition Laws in 
Conflict, supra, at 1 (noting “multiple (and proliferating) antitrust authorities”). 
256 Hammond, Charting New Waters, supra, at 2 (March 2, 2006).  See also Barnett, 
Presentation, supra at 4. 
257 Cf. Paul Stephan, Against International Cooperation, in Competition Laws in Conflict: 
Antitrust Jurisdiction in a Global Economy 66, 76 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, 
eds. 2004) (noting attention to the possibility of “soft harmonization” of antitrust laws, 
defined as establishing baseline levels of antitrust regulation to which sovereigns may 
aspire). 
258 This is something akin to a “mutually assured destruction” principle. 
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deterrence concern becomes all the more relevant when litigation 
involves worldwide plaintiff classes. 
 
3.  Applying the Updated Standing Analysis to the Empagran 
Exception 
 
Courts deciding whether claims of foreign harm can be brought in 
U.S. antitrust courts post-Empagran can apply the modified 
Associated General Contractors framework to the extraterritoriality 
problem.  Application of these factors in the extraterritoriality arena 
was undertaken two decades ago in deAtucha v. Commodity 
Exchange, Inc.259 In that case, an Argentinian plaintiff who 
purchased silver on the London Metals Exchange sought to sue in a 
U.S. antitrust court.260 The plaintiff alleged harm resulting from the 
infamous effort by the Hunt brothers to monopolize the silver 
market.261 The court noted both that the injury suffered was causally 
remote from effects in U.S. commerce, and that domestic plaintiffs 
were available to vindicate the deterrence concern.262 The court 
denied standing.263 
 
a. Antitrust Injury in Extraterritorial Application 
 
In extraterritorial application, the antitrust injury question is 
whether the U.S. antitrust laws exist to remedy the particular foreign 
harm.  This has two facets—is the harm, regardless of locale, harm 
cognizable by the U.S. antitrust scheme?  Assuming it is, the second 
question is whether harm in that location is a matter of concern under 
the U.S. antitrust laws.  After Matsushita, the answer to the second 
question seemingly was a clear “no.”  In that case, price fixing in 
Japan was not within the purview of a U.S. antitrust court.  
Matsushita appears to be a specific application of the general rule 
that the antitrust laws exist to protect American, not foreign, 
 
259 deAtucha v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 510, 514-518 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
260 deAtucha, 608 F. Supp. at 513. 
261 Ibid. 
262 Id. at 518. 
263 Ibid. 
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commerce.264 According to the district court in deAtucha, “Congress 
did not contemplate recovery under the antitrust laws by an 
individual who traded, and was injured entirely outside of United 
States commerce.”265 
However, both Matsushita and deAtucha involved circumstances 
that undermined arguments that U.S. antitrust policy was an 
appropriate vehicle to protect the plaintiffs.  In Matsushita, the injury 
was accompanied by benefits to U.S. consumers—much like the 
supposed harm in Brunswick Corp.266 In deAtucha, the plaintiff’s 
injury was incurred in a wholly foreign market regulated by its own 
antitrust schemes.  Under Empagran, the door remains open to 
claims of foreign harm not undermined by those infirmities and that 
meet the Empagran exception. 
 Supporting such an argument would be facts tending to establish a 
sufficiently proximate causal relationship—like the allegations in 
eMag Solutions of present intent and ability to engage in geographic 
arbitrage to end run foreign fixed prices.  Other relevant evidence 
would speak to whether the particular foreign sovereign’s antitrust 
scheme—or lack thereof—would be adversely affected.  Such 
evidence might be testimony by experts in the particular foreign 
scheme, or amicus participation by the U.S. Department of State or 
the foreign government.  Facts bearing on the under-deterrence and 
inverse-deterrence rationales would be relevant.  For example, 
evidence that the defendant specifically aimed its conduct at the 
foreign market because of the lack of regulation would demonstrate a 
need for a U.S. court to regulate that conduct.  Evidence as to 
whether the particular sovereign had its own amnesty program (like 
 
264 See deAtucha, 608 F. Supp. at 517 (citing Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 
308, 314 (1978), and 21 Cong. Rec. 2456 (1890) (statements of Senator Sherman (referring 
to the “interests of the United States”)); 2 Waller, Antitrust & Am. Bus. Abroad, supra,
§ 13:23 (“Congress has stated that [the Sherman Act] was intended, first, to protect the 
competitive health of U.S. markets * * * and second * * * to protect export opportunities for 
American-based firms.”). 
265 Id. at 518. 
266 See Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 394 (2d Cir. 2002) (“If conduct 
affecting foreign markets has a substantial but beneficial effect on our markets, such 
conduct does noo implicate the concerns of the antitrust laws.”). 
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Germany) and whether the U.S. program was threatened with being 
undermined by this action would be important. 
 
b.  Directness in the Extraterritorial Context 
 
The Illinois Brick element requires the plaintiff be a direct 
purchaser to have standing to sue for an antitrust violation.  
According to recent scholarship analyzing Empagran, “[i]n foreign-
purchaser cases,” the indirect-purchaser sort of remoteness “does not 
arise.  Often, the foreign plaintiff purchases directly from the 
wrongdoers.”267 The indirectness at play is instead a function of the 
first element: antitrust injury.  The foreign purchaser’s claim to 
antitrust injury is derivative of the claim of a purchaser in the 
domestic market.  In that sense, every foreign purchaser is an 
“indirect purchaser” because its purchase does not give rise to a 
claim.  Instead, its right to sue depends on the existence of an effect 
in U.S. commerce causing harm to a different plaintiff, and a 
sufficiently direct link between that effect and the foreign purchaser’s 
harm.  According to the court in deAtucha, the Illinois Brick “indirect 
purchaser” analysis “is not an issue” in a case dealing with foreign 
purchasers but lacking “innocent middlemen.”268 
No need exists to write the indirect purchaser rule out of the 
antitrust standing analysis in the extraterritoriality context.  Certainly 
cases might arise in which a foreign purchaser buys from a foreign 
distributor that in turn had paid artificially high prices due to a price-
fixing cartel.  The concerns for duplicate recovery on which Illinois 
Brick is based are as strong here as in the case of domestic 
commerce.  In this case, the foreign indirect purchaser’s harm is 
remote both because its harm is derivative of some harm felt in U.S. 
commerce, and because its harm is derivative of the distributor’s 
harm.  Such a case should be subjected both to the antitrust injury 
analysis and to the Illinois Brick analysis.  Another indirect purchaser 
situation might arise that does not implicate the antitrust injury 
question.  A foreign plaintiff that purchases from a domestic 
 
267 Cavanaugh, supra, 58 S.M.U. L. Rev. at 1444. 
268 deAtucha, 608 F. Supp. at 514. 
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distributor of products made by a foreign manufacturer does suffer 
harm in U.S. commerce, so can show antitrust injury.  It nonetheless 
is prevented from suing as an indirect purchaser.  
 
c.  Remaining Standing Factors 
 
The other plaintiff factor asks whether a plaintiff suffered harm in 
domestic commerce and is thus better situated than the foreign 
plaintiff before the court to vindicate the purposes of the antitrust 
laws.  If there is no other plaintiff, or if the other plaintiff cannot be 
relied on to bring suit on its own behalf, it may be necessary to 
permit even a less-than-ideal foreign plaintiff to sue.269 
Under the interpretation of the FTAIA that prevailed in the 
Supreme Court’s Empagran opinion, a plaintiff suffering wholly 
foreign harm relies on effects in domestic commerce to support its 
right to sue.  If the domestic effects have resulted in injury to other 
potential plaintiffs, the other plaintiffs will be available to sue to 
vindicate the purposes of the antitrust laws.270 When a domestic 
plaintiff exists, the possibility of a suit also by the foreign plaintiff 
raises the specters of over-deterrence and inverse deterrence.271 But 
if the domestic plaintiff does not exist, it may be appropriate to 
permit a foreign plaintiff to sue over wholly foreign harm despite 
tenuous antitrust injury allegations.272 
269 Cf. Pfizer Corp. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 315 (1981) (justifying a cause 
of action for foreign plaintiffs in part by the necessity of filling the deterrence purposes of 
the antitrust laws); Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472-473 (1982) 
(reading Pfizer Corp. for the proposition that broadly interpreting the class of persons 
entitled to sue under Section 4 vindicates the deterrent purposes of the antitrust laws).   
270 According to the deAtucha court, “individuals who traded on United States exchanges 
and who may have suffered injury * * * are an identifiable class of persons whose claims 
[can] ‘vindicate the public interest.’” deAtucha, 608 F. Supp. at 518.  In deAtucha, as in 
Empagran, claims by domestic purchasers were proceeding in the Southern District of New 
York.  See id. at 518 n.21 (citing cases). 
271 See supra nn. 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing the “over-deterrence” concerns 
for chilling useful conduct through excess potential liability); supra nn. 68-71 and 
accompanying text (discussing the paradoxical “inverse deterrence” concern that arises 
when excessive liability hardens cartels and makes detection more difficult). 
272 See deAtucha, 608 F. Supp. at 518 (noting the importance of deterrence rationales). 
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The manageability factor primarily raises the question whether the 
claims before the court will be so numerous, and raise such difficult 
issues because of the geopolitical ramifications, that they would 
overwhelm the U.S. court system.  If so, they risk raising the costs of 
enforcement to the defendant and to the court system to a degree that 
it exceeds the benefits of enforcement.273 It is the sheer number of 
potential plaintiffs with strong incentives to bring suit in U.S. 
antitrust courts274 seeking U.S. remedies that causes concern.  But if 
the numbers of plaintiffs prove not to be massive—e.g., if only one 
potential plaintiff exists, and that plaintiff suffered harm in foreign 
commerce—the manageability concern favors permitting suit.275 
Like the manageability concern, the dangers of duplicate recovery 
and complex damages apportionment increase as does the number of 
plaintiffs.  Worldwide plaintiff classes thus present particular 
concerns due to the sheer number of potential plaintiffs.  A separate 
problem is that where a foreign purchaser’s right to sue is derivative 
of a domestic plaintiff’s right, the likelihood of duplicate recovery 
and complex apportionment increases.  Finally, the concern for 
complexity is heightened when one considers the range of different 
economic systems worldwide. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In Empagran, the Supreme Court drew only a narrow bright-line 
rule.  The exception to that rule, for any wholly foreign harm with a 
sufficient nexus to a domestic U.S. effect, has engendered substantial 
confusion, a state heightened by the Court’s failure adequately to 
prescribe an approach to implementing the Empagran exception.  
The proximate cause inquiry courts have settled on is neither 
doctrinally supportable nor procedurally workable. 
 
273 See Cavanagh, 58 S.M.U. L. Rev., supra, at __ (noting that “‘massive and complex 
damages litigation’” will involve “equally massive and complex foreign evidence”) (quoting 
Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 545). 
274 As noted above, the U.S. system and body of substantive antitrust law have many 
features that make them more plaintiff-friendly than most, if not all, foreign systems and 
legal schemes.  See supra nn. 2-6 and accompanying text. 
275 Cf., e.g., deAtucha, 608 F. Supp. at 514. 
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This article offers a solution.  The well-established and regularly 
applied prudential antitrust standing analysis is readily imported, 
with modifications from Empagran, into the extraterritoriality 
framework.  Applying standing doctrine extraterritorially, courts 
should examine the elements of the Associated General Contractors 
framework to determine whether the particular plaintiff is well 
situated to vindicate the purposes of the antitrust laws.  Modified for 
extraterritorial application, the analysis includes consideration of 
comity and inverse-deterrence rationales that have become relevant 
since Empagran.
Although analyzing these considerations might be new experience 
for courts schooled in the pre-Empagran antitrust extraterritoriality 
analysis, a body of common law thinking will develop to assist courts 
in balancing the policies of deference to foreign sovereign regulation; 
deference to U.S. government enforcement; concerns for protecting 
plaintiffs and under-deterrence; concerns for over-deterrence; and 
other costs and benefits associated with antitrust enforcement.276 
The standing analysis will permit courts the flexibility they require to 
adjust for changing understandings of those policies and other factors 
perhaps not yet recognized.  As the question how to define the 
Empagran exception works its way through the courts, and perhaps 
back to the Supreme Court, the approach outlined here promises 
consistent and doctrinally correct decisions. 
276 Common law analysis is a well-recognized feature of the antitrust scheme.  Then-
professor Easterbrook noted:      
The Sherman and Clayton Acts authorized the Supreme Court to invent 
and enforce a law of restraint of trade in the common law fashion.  The 
Court has consistently drawn on the common law tradition.  The 
common law evolves as circumstances change and learning grows. 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Rachet in Antitrust Law?, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 705, 706 
(1982). 
